a would-be telecom giants, CrossTalk and GlobalDialog. Each can choose whether to invest $10 billion in the purchase of a fiber-optic network. They make their investment decisions simultaneously. If neither chooses to make the investment, that is the end of the game. f one invests and the other does not, then the investor has to make a pricing decision for its telecom services. It can choose either a high price, which will attract 60 million customers, from each of whom it will make an operating profit of $400, or a low price, which will attract 80 million customers, from each of whom it will make an operating profit of $200. f both firms acquire fiber-optic networks and enter the market, then their pricing choices become a second simultaneous- move game. Each can choose either the high or the low price. f both choose the high price, they will split the total market equally; so each will get 30 million customers and an operating