a. You are a monopolist of cherts and one of many sellers ofints. Consumers are willing to pay $213 for a chelt. Your marginal cost for a chert is $4. You also sell into the int market, where your marginal cost, like that of all other int sellers. is $2. i. What is your prot, if you price cherts and Hints independently? ii. Would a tying arrangement increase your prots? 1}. You are, again1 a monopolist ofcherts. The demand curve for cherts is given by the equation, QCH = 100 EPCH , where QCH is the quantity of cherts demanded, and PCH is the price of cherts. The marginal cost of cherts is $1. 'What is the prot-maxinnzing price of cherts? c. You also sell into the market for Hints, which is perfectly competitive. The marginal cost of ints is also $1. Some int consumers also value chert, but some do not. The demand curve for int by customers who buy both chert and int is QF,CH= 5t] PF. The demand curve for int by customers who buy only int is QF = 50 PF. Now suppose that you consider a tying arrangement, in which you only sell cherts to consumers if they buy all their ints from you= too. Is it possible to increase prots over what you got under independent pricing? Prove your answer numerically. d. Is your answer to pa1t (c) the same as what you determined in part {a}? Explain why the two answers are, or are not, the same