1. According to Rubinstein (1982):

   	a.	If agents are allowed to counter-offer, the game will immediately converge to a fair split income.
   	b.	Delay is costly, and bargaining over unfair proposals wastes peoples time.
   	c.	If agents are allowed to counter-offer, then its very hard to reach an agreement.
   	d.	All of the above.
   	e.	Only a. and b.
   	f.	Only a. and c.

According to the study by Andersen, Ertac, Gneezy, Hoffman & List (2011) on ultimatum games in poor villages in Northeast India:

	a.	The average share offered increases as the stakes increase.
	b.	The total rejection rate decreases as the stakes increase.
	c.	The rejection rate for unfair offers decreases as the stakes increase.
	d.	Only b. and c.
	e.	Only a., b. and c.
	f.	None of the above.

1. According to Roth (1995), in ultimatum games face-to-face proposals are rejected _____ than anonymous proposals.

   	a.	More often.
   	b.	Less often.
   	c.	As often.

2. In practice, we observe in ultimatum games:

   	a.	A large number of even-split offers.
   	b.	Almost no rejections.
   	c.	An amount of low offers similar to what the theory suggests.
   	d.	All of the above.

3. In ultimatum games, the rational (i.e. optimal) strategy for the proposer is:

   	a.	Offer as much as possible to the respondent.
   	b.	Offer as little as possible to the respondent.
   	c.	Split the offer 50/50.
   	d.	There is no rational strategy.

4. According to Roth (1995), in ultimatum games anonymous proposals are rejected _____ than face-to-face proposals.

   	a.	More often.
   	b.	Less often.
   	c.	As often.

5. You are about to participate in a private value auction. There will be a total of 30 rational participants in the auction. You have been informed by a higher being that, of the 30 participants, you have the second highest private valuation. This implies that one of the other 29 participants has a higher private value. In which type of auction you are theleast likely to win the auction?

   	a.	In an English auction.
   	b.	In a Dutch auction.
   	c.	In a 1st price, sealed bid auction.
   	d.	It depends on the value of the object.
   	e.	It cannot be determined.

6. With rational agents, the winners curse implies:

   	a.	That buyers are going to overbid.
   	b.	That the seller is going to sell the object for less than its true value.
   	c.	That buyers will buy a defective object.
   	d.	Only a. and b.
   	e.	Only a. and c.
   	f.	Only a., b., and c.

7. Consider a first-price auction with common values and two rational bidders with uniformly distributed signals S₁ and S₂. The true value of the object being auctioned is given by V = (S₁ + S₂)/2.

   	a.	Both bidders should bid their signals.
   	b.	If we do a million of such auctions, the average auction price will be close to V.
   	c.	If V is known, then the object should sell for V.
   	d.	All of the above.
   	e.	Only a. and b.
   	f.	Only a. and c.

8. What is true about common value auctions?

   	a.	With common values, the English and second-price auctions are strategically equivalent.
   	b.	With common values, the Dutch and first-price auctions are strategically equivalent.
   	c.	Security markets are dominated by common values.
   	d.	All of the above.
   	e.	Only a. and c.
   	f.	Only b. and c.

9. You are about to participate in a private value auction. There will be a total of 30 rational participants in the auction. You have been informed by a higher being that, of the 30 participants, you have the second highest private valuation. This implies that one of the other 29 participants has a higher private value. In which type of auction you are the least likely to win the auction?

   	a.	In a Dutch auction.
   	b.	In a 1st price, sealed bid auction.
   	c.	In a 2nd price, sealed bid auction.
   	d.	It depends on the value of the object.
   	e.	It cannot be determined.

10. Which of the following action(s) can a seller take to reduce the winners curse?

    	a.	Use the English auction format, rather than the sealed bid format, to conduct the auction.
    	b.	Hire an independent agent to provide an opinion of the value of the asset and make the agents valuation public prior to the auction.
    	c.	Use a 1st price sealed bid auction and have as many participants as possible.
    	d.	All of the above
    	e.	Only a. and b.
    	f.	Only a. and c.

11. With common values, the English and second-price sealed-bid auctions are strategically equivalent.

    	a.	True.
    	b.	False.
    	c.	It depends on the type of object.