Airport wasn't equiped with ground radar as a resource to ATC in situations where there is lack off visibility due to climatic KLM's duty-time regulations caused the KLM pilot to be anxious to takeoff in order to not violate the duty-time limit No evidence linking the disaster that can be termed under Organizational Process Captains were not playing a supervisory role to collaborate with the First Offfficer and Flight Engineer, its more off an auth Not applicable as the entire KLM crew were quite experienced including the Captain, First Offffier and the Flight Engineer No known issues that were not reported or taken care off Couldn't find evidence off wilfful supervisory violation Lack off standardised communication led to key misunderstandings (The KLM crew offten vasilated between English and D Not applicable. No evidence observed KLM Captain van Zanten was ffrustrated due to delays and was in a hurry to takeoff as he didn't want to violate KLM overt Not applicable. No evidence observed Not applicable. No evidence observed This is a major factor that one can attribute to this disaster including poor visibility due to ffoggy conditions, congested air When the tower told the KLM crew to "Standby ffor takeoff, I will call you.", the PanAm crew made their "We're still taxing second Radio Heterodyne or "whistling sound" in the KLM radio Not applicable - no mistakes in automatized behavior The KLM Captain van Zanten made a poor choice off decision by not clearly conffirming that he is cleared ffor take off M pilots conffused ATC clearance with the take off clearance. When the Tower stated "climb to and maintain Flight level take off. He was only giving instructions on what to do once fflight was cleared to take off. This is gross error led by percep No willfful violations The decision to takeoff by the KLM Pilot inspite off not having a clear go ffrom the Air Traffffic control is a case off excepti