Al and Bucky are playing "Extensive Form Chicken". First, Al decides whether to participate or not. If Al doesn't participate (N), the respective payoffs of Al and Bucky are (0, 1). In the case that Al participates (P), Bucky chooses whether to participate or not. If Bucky doesn't participate (n), Al and Bucky get the payoffs (1, 0). If Bucky participates (p), the following game is played.

5. (24 points) Al and Bucky are playing "Extensive Form Chicken". First, Al decides whether to participate or not. If Al doesn't participate (N), the respective payoffs of Al and Bucky are (0, 1). In the case that Al participates (P), Bucky chooses whether to participate or not. If Bucky doesn't participate (n), Al and Bucky get the payoffs (1,0). If Bucky participates (p), the following game is played. Bucky Swerve( S) Straight (c) Al Swerve( S) -1, -1 -2,2 Straight (C) 2, -2 -5, -5 (a) Draw the game tree. (b) Solve for all subgame perfect equilibria of this game. Is there a sub- game perfect equilibrium where Al and Bucky might end up bumping into each other (both continue straight with positive probability)? Explain. (c) Put the game in strategic form. List any pure-strategy Nash equi- libria of this game that are not subgame perfect. Which of these equilibria involve a noncredible threat