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Two Cournot duopolists compete in a market with inverse demand given by p = 32.00 - 20, where p is the per-unit price, q, is the output for firm i (either firm 1 or firm 2), and Q = q1 + q2. Both firms face constant marginal costs of $2 per unit. Assume no fixed costs. What is the optimal output for firm 1? (Round to two decimals if necessary.) What is the optimal output for firm 2? (Round to two decimals if necessary.) Part 2 (1 point) See Hint What is the equilibrium price in this market? $ (Round to two decimals if necessary.) Part 3 (2 points) See Hint What is the profit for each firm? Firm 1 profit: $ (Round to two decimals if necessary.) Firm 2 profit: $ (Round to two decimals if necessary.)