An incumbent firm's patent is expiring. In the face of new entrants, it is considering whether to engage in a price war (fight) or to accept entry (accommodate). The situation can be represented in a game tree form as in the figure below. The numbers indicate the payoffs for (New Entrant, Incumbent). How would you advise the Incumbent firm to maximize its payoff? Virtual Insight Series (Summer) - 1469025 https://event.webcasts.com/starthere.jsp?ei=1... Price War Incumbent (2,4) Accommodate Enter New Entrant (1, 6 ) Not enter O A. Create an entry barrier by changing the payoff associated with {Enter, Accommodate] to (1.5, 3). O B. Make a credible public announcement to fight new entrants by changing the payoff associated with {Enter, Accommodate} to (2, 3). O C. Make it clear to all that the Incumbent has significant excess capacity such that the true payoff of a price war from fighting is actually (0, 5). O D. The game maximizes payoff for the Incumbent as is