ANDERSON AUTOPARTS DIVIDEND POLICY

"In a way, this is a pleasant problem to have," remarked Harry Gidwitz, the CEO of Anderson Autoparts, to Ian Lyle, director of marketing, as they entered the company's boardroom. "I suspect we wouldn't have to deal with it if our future didn't look so good."

ANDERSON

Anderson is a relatively small auto parts producer with annual sales of $150 million. Despite a reputation for low cost and above average quality products, Anderson's sales history is not especially impressive. There have been a number of problems that have plagued the firm. Though automakers are not able to manufacture parts as cheaply as outside suppliers (due largely to higher wage differentials), the practice of relying on outside suppliers runs the disastrous production risk that the supply of parts will be interrupted. For this reason and because automakers want to minimize inventory costs, auto parts suppliers must be able to provide "just-in-time" delivery (parts arrive when needed) and equipment of exceptional quality. Until recently, Anderson could do neither. But an improved quality control system and a more efficient distribution network now enables the firm to deliver products "as needed" with a very low failure rate.

Anderson historically has also had difficulty in developing the innovative products in demand by automakers. This too has changed. The firm has a number of new auto parts that are quite useful to car manufacturers. For example, it developed a new stainless-steel exhaust system that is much lighter than the traditional cast-iron system.

The result of all these changes is that in 1996 (present year) Anderson's sales increased by 20 percent and its earnings per share by 73 percent. And the future looks bright. Anderson has obtained its first-ever multiyear contract with a car manufacturer and more are expected. (See Exhibit 2 for the best-guess or most likely five-year sales forecast.) The anticipated growth, however, will require considerable capital to finance. Harry Gidwitz believes this is a good time to take a critical look at Anderson's dividend policy, which he has characterized as "historically generous but probably appropriate." Exhibit 1 shows the firm's dividend history, which has resulted from a policy of level dividends with increases only when management felt the increase was sustainable.

DIVIDEND DISCUSSION

There is no shortage of opinions among Anderson's directors about what should be done. John Forsyth, an outside director and president of Northeastern Power & Light, believes that to lower the dividend per share (DPS) would be a sign of weakness and would lower the share price. "In fact," argues Forsyth, "we are poised for our largest growth in sales and EPS in the history of the company. If we lower DPS we will send the financial markets a wrong signal about our future prospects."

"I agree with John," says Ian Lyle, director of marketing. "A dividend decision has aspects of a marketing decision. Appearances count. If we lower DPS we run the risk of transmitting a wrong message." Lyle then hands out a memo containing two pieces of evidence-one theoretical and one empirical--to support his view. He refers to the equation Po = D/(K- g), which he feels is an indication that an increase in DPS will raise the price of Anderson's stock. He then cites the experience of Hawkins-Elgin, another industry firm, which eliminated dividends in 1991 and promptly saw the price of its stock drop 20 percent in 10 days. Lyle believes the firm should strongly consider making the yearly dividend a constant percentage of EPS in order to keep the growth of DPS in line with the growth of EPS. "That way," he argues, "we send the right signal to the financial markets about our earnings prospects." His specific proposal is to make DPS 50 percent of EPS, a percentage that he notes is low by historical standards.

Jean Bloomingdale, Anderson's treasurer, is sympathetic to the view that dividends should not be cut. She knows, however, that the firm will have substantial capital requirements over the next three to five years. Bloomingdale refers the group to the five-year sales and cash flow forecast that she made a few weeks ago. (See Exhibit 2.) In her view, the most sensible dividend policy is to determine each year how much cash the firm internally generates, implement all attractive investment projects, and pay any

leftover cash as dividends. "This way," she observes, "we might be able to avoid external funds and minimize the hassle and flotation costs of raising the capital we need."

Jesse Bergenfeld, an outside director and chief financial officer of the nation's largest toy manufacturer, seems amused by what he has heard to this point. "Everything said so far ignores the risk of the industry you're in. Sales and EPS projections don't always work out, you know, especially in an industry heavily dependent on automobile sales." He cites the "erratic" sales history of Anderson over the last 15 years. (See Exhibit 1.) Moving quickly to the chalkboard, he scribbles what he thinks future sales could be (see Exhibit 2(a)) and notes that these estimates are consistent with the expectation of higher sales yet take into account the fluctuations of Anderson's past sales. "And," Bergenfeld points out, "your firm needs financial flexibility to handle sudden shifts in production technique and your product mix. All of this," he concludes, "argues for a conservative DPS."

Helen Carrol, a senior vice president, can see merit to all the arguments. She wonders, though, if dividends shouldn't be eliminated entirely until the firm's financial situation becomes more stable. Carrol then presents data (see Exhibit 3) that seem to contradict Lyle's evidence. "Within each industry there is an inverse relationship between payout and the price to earnings (P/E) ratio. Note especially the automobile manufacturers where the two foreign producers have lower payouts and higher P/E's than the three American firms."

THE CEO'S VIEW

Gidwitz wonders how much all of this matters anyway. He's sure that Anderson will be able to raise money from external sources if necessary. "The important thing this company faces is the successful implementation of the commercial strategy we've begun in the last year or so. This is where we'll be judged by investors." Still, he thinks it might be embarrassing for Anderson if it had to tap external sources when, say, the share price was unusually low. And he admits he likes the idea of avoiding external financing if possible in order to minimize the hassle and cost of raising the needed capital. At the same time, he believes the firm's stockholders "expect DPS to increase, especially in light of our bright future." He then refers to a company survey showing the vast majority of the stockholders are happy with the firm's present dividend policy. "Perhaps a reasonable compromise is an increase in DPS to $1.10, keeping it there until our growth levels and avoiding any new stock issues. That way, we keep our stockholders happy and avoid the amusing situation of simultaneously paying dividends and selling new shares. If we need external funds, we borrow. Flotation costs are lower with a bond issue than a stock issue anyway." Discussion then centers on other points that are seen as relevant to the decision. At book values, the firm currently has $15 million of long-term debt and $60 million of equity. This is a debt/equity ratio of .25, which the firm feels is optimal.

No one feels it is a good idea to pay any dividend if to do so means the firm would have to forego any of its planned investments, especially given the substantial publicity surrounding Anderson's present situation.