Andy owns a Candy factory with noisy machines which disturb his neighbor Barb.

Andy profits from running his noisy factory by ^A =100,000. Producing candy without making noise would be costly for Andy - if Andy were forced to run his factory silently, the profits of the factory would fall by 60,000 so he would only make a profit of 40,000. Otherwise, Andy could just shut down his factory entirely and earn nothing.

Barb gets a payoff of ^B =70,000 from a quiet neighborhood. She will get a payoff of zero (^B =0) if she has to endure Andy's noise. Barb could wear earplugs, but that discomfort and inconvenience would leave her with a payoff of only ^B =20,000.

Suppose Andy is now allowed to be noisy if he chooses, but Barb has a liability right to collect damages for any harms she bears from the noise.

Note that if she has earplugs, she does not bear any harms from the noise, so she will only be paid if Andy operates noisily and she does not wear earplugs (she is not paid any damages for wearing earplugs).

If bargaining is possible, what is Andy's threat value?