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Question: As the newly appointed Business Development Executive of the selected organisation you are required to study the business environment of the selected organisation and develop a presentation document for its management on the strategic management key business areas in order to achieve the desired competitive advantage and organisational goal. The presentation document should provide clear reference to the organisational context and application of relevant theory. The following areas should be included in the presentation: 1.1 Provide an introduction and organisational background. (6 marks) 1.2 For many years, employee motivation was regarded as one of the most challenging areas for organisational productivity, hence a suitable panacea must be applied to address this concern. Managers are contemplating the implementation of the Expectancy Theory and Equity theory to address employee motivation challenges. Compare and evaluate the Expectancy Theory and Equity theory, as suitable approaches to motivating the diverse employees in your organisation. (25 marks) 1.3 Managers of different business units or departments are not pulling together and have been operating in silos, competing against each other, which is affecting the overall performance of the organisation and team work. In light of this challenge, research and critically discuss the strategic importance of team composition on the dynamics and cohesiveness of the work team. (24 marks)

1.4 In 2020, the Coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic resulted in a massive, unexpected, and sudden disruption to many organisations around the world. Organisations and employees have been forced to transform their operational routines virtually in a short space of time. This has resulted in unprecedented demands on managers to make decisions in very uncertain conditions. In times of crises such as these, employees turn to organisational leaders for information, which amplifies demands for effective communication of critical decisions. In general, in the "new normal" which resulted from the COVID-19 pandemic, have seen many professional employees working from home. This presented a whole range of communication challenges. In response, organisations adopted technology-driven solutions, where they communicated time-critical information via multiple channels. Provide a critical evaluation on how your organisation effectively used technological advances in communication to share information with their stakeholders during the period of crisis. Use the communications process model as a basis for your evaluation, and provide strategic recommendations to improve the management of organisational communication in future. (25 marks)

1.5 A strong culture can be a sustainable competitive advantage, if not the only sustainable competitive advantage because it cannot be duplicated, unlike a product, price point, or delivery system. A healthy company culture provides an environment that supports stronger recruiting, retention, increased customer intimacy and loyalty, greater productivity, and an increased sense of employee ownership. High performance companies really work hard to identify, define and deliver the right culture that meets market needs. They spend a lot of time in creating the right organisational environment that not only attracts the right people, but also sets them up to successfully deliver on their strategy. Critically analyse the implications of organisational culture with respect to change, diversity and mergers and acquisitions. Each of the three aspects must be substantiated with a specific example obtained from the business environment of your organisation, own experiences and current literature. (16 marks)

1.6 Provide an overall conclusion of the presentation. (4 mark

Instructions. Each question is 33 points. Good Luck! 1. Let P be the set of lotteries over {a, b, c} x {L. M. R). In which of the following pairs of games the players' preferences over P are the same? (a) L M R L M R 2,-2 1,1 -3.7 a 12,-1 5.0 -3,2 1,10 0.4 0.4 5,3 3,1 3,1 -2,1 1,7 -1,-5 -1,0 5,2 1,-2 (b) L M R L M R 1.2 7,0 4,-1 1,5 7,1 4-1 6.1 2.2 8.4 6.3 2,4 8.8 3,-1 9,2 5.0 9,5 5,1 2. Let P be the set of all lotteries p = (Pr, py; p.) on a set C = {r, y, z } of consequences. Below, you are given pairs of indifference sets on P. For each pair, check whether the indifference sets belong to a preference relation that has a Von-Neumann and Morgenstern representation (ie. expected utility representation). If the answer is Yes, provide a Von-Neumann and Morgenstern utility function; otherwise show which Von-Neumann and Morgenstern axiom is violated. (In the figures below, setting p. = 1 - Pr - Py; we describe P as a subset of IR?.) (a) = (plex = 2py + 1} and 12 = {plPr = 4py + 1} (b) h = (plps = 2py + 1} and 12 = {plpr = 2p,} (c) h = (plp, 1/2} (d) h = {ply = (pz)" + 1/2} and 12 = {plpy = (px)}} 3. On a given set of lotteries, find a discontinuous preference relation > that satisfies the independence axiom.Instructions. Each question is 33 points. Good Luck! 1. Let P be the set of lotteries over {a, b, c} x {L. M. R). In which of the following pairs of games the players' preferences over P are the same? (a) L M R L M R 2,-2 1,1 -3.7 a 12,-1 5.0 -3,2 1,10 0.4 0.4 5,3 3,1 3,1 -2,1 1,7 -1,-5 -1,0 5,2 1,-2 (b) L M R L M R 1.2 7,0 4,-1 1,5 7,1 4-1 6.1 2.2 8.4 6.3 2,4 8.8 3,-1 9,2 5.0 9,5 5,1 2. Let P be the set of all lotteries p = (Pr, py; p.) on a set C = {r, y, z } of consequences. Below, you are given pairs of indifference sets on P. For each pair, check whether the indifference sets belong to a preference relation that has a Von-Neumann and Morgenstern representation (ie. expected utility representation). If the answer is Yes, provide a Von-Neumann and Morgenstern utility function; otherwise show which Von-Neumann and Morgenstern axiom is violated. (In the figures below, setting p. = 1 - Pr - Py; we describe P as a subset of IR?.) (a) = (plex = 2py + 1} and 12 = {plPr = 4py + 1} (b) h = (plps = 2py + 1} and 12 = {plpr = 2p,} (c) h = (plp, 1/2} (d) h = {ply = (pz)" + 1/2} and 12 = {plpy = (px)}} 3. On a given set of lotteries, find a discontinuous preference relation > that satisfies the independence axiom.1. Compute a sequential equilibrium of the following game. 1 X D (2, 0 ) I 2 R 1 a b (7) (9) (3) (4) (4 ) 2. Consider the following centipede game. There are 27 dates t = 1, 2. ..., 27. At each odd date t = 1, 3,.... player 1 gets to choose between exit, which ends the game, and stay, after which the game proceeds to * + 1. At each even date t = 2, 4, ..., 27, player 2 chooses between exit and stay. At 27, the game ends even after stay. Player 1 has two types, namely, rational and irrational, with probabilities 1 - & and &, respectively for some & E (0, 1/2), and player 2 has only one type. The irrational type gets -1 if he exits and 0 otherwise. For all the other types, if player i exits at t, player i gets t + 1 and the other player gets -1. At t = 27, after stay, rational player 1 gets 27 + 2 and player 2 gets 2T. (a) Compute the sequential equilibrium. (You do not need to show that it is unique.) (b) For every T > 2, find the smallest & under which the rational type of player 1 stays with probability 1 at t = 1. Briefly discuss your finding. (c) (Bonus) Prove or disprove the following statement. There exists an E > 0 such that for every & E (0, z), the unique Nash equilibrium outcome is that either (the rational) player 1 exits at t = 1 or player 2 exits at t = 2 (if player 1 happens to be irrational). 3. Fix a finite extensive-form game G* and consider a family of extensive-form games G' in which everything is as in G except for the probabilities assigned by the nature at the histories the nature moves. Assume that for any history h at which nature moves and for any available action a E A (h), the probability a" (a|h) nature assigns to a at h in game G" converges to the probability a" (ajh) nature assigns to a at h in game G". Show that for any sequence of assessments (o", ("), if (o, " ) is a sequential equilibrium of G'" for each m and (o", /") - (o", "), then (@", /" ) is a sequential equilibrium of G*.1. Consider the following game 3.2 0,0 0.0 1,1 0.0 2.3 1,1 0,0 0.0 0,0 -1,-1 1,1 1,1 -1,-1 0,0 (a) Compute the set of rationalizable strategies. (b) Compute the set of correlated equilibrium distributions. (c) Identify a correlated equilibrium that is not a Nash equilibrium. 2. This question asks you to establish the formal link between correlated equilibrium and Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Assuming everything is finite, consider a game G = (N. S. u) . (a) For any given (common-prior) information structure (0, I, p), find a type space (7, p') where the types do not affect the the payoffs in G and a one-to-one mapping Ti between the information cells I, (w) and types , (1, (w)) E T. (for all i e N). such that an adapted strategy profiles = ($1, ... .S,) w.r.t. (0, 1, p) is a correlated equilibrium if and only if sor- is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of (G, T, p'). [Here, Sor = (S1OTT , ..., SHOT 1) is such that, for every type ti, s,or; (t;) = si (w) for some w with T, (I (w)) = ti-] (b) For any type space (T, p') where the types do not affect the the payoffs in G, find a information structure (2, I, p) and a one-to-one mapping w : T - ? such that S = ($1, . . ., Sn) is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of (G, T. p') if and only if sow-1 is a correlated equilibrium. 3. For any given game G = (N, S, u), a set Z = Z1 x . .. x Z. C S is said to be closed under rational behavior if for every ie N, & E Z,, there exists , E A (Z_,) such that Z E arg max,, u; (si, /)- (a) Show that if Z is closed under rational behavior, then Z C S". (b) Show that for any family of sets Z" that are closed under rational behavior, the set Z = (U.Z;) x . .. x (U.Zi) is closed under rational behavior. Conclude that the largest set 2' that is closed under rational behavior exists. (c) Show that Z* = 50.Problem Set 1 A. Risk Aversion Consider a risk averse consumer with probability p of becoming sick. Let /, be the consumer's income if he becomes sick, and let Ins be his income if he does not become sick, with Is