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CASE STUDY 7 U.S. Air Force ERP Bonfire The U.S. Air Force operates a very large supply chain to sup- slowed progress. Air Force leaders did not execute a thorough workforce of more than 90,000 individuals, is managed by Mate- seemed to specify the desired capabilities of the new ERP system. riel Command (AFMC). AFMC is responsible for the purchasing, Finally, as the project lurched forward, far too much customization tracking, and use of thousands of parts and millions of gallons of was built into the ERP system as Air Force managers insisted that port its flying operations. This logistics mission, composed of agap analysis, too many leaders supervised the project, and no one the new ERP system needed to support existing proces than adopt the inherent processes offered by Oracle el at more than 150 installations worldwide. AFMC supports the Air Force, an organization with a yearly budget of about $165 bil- lion with about 300,000 service members. This makes it about the size of General Motors or General Electric After numerous setbacks and several failed attempts the program, in November 2012, the Air Force canceled the entire In 2003, Air Force leadership began to notice the marked project after spending $1.03 bllion. The Air Force concluded that improvement in logistics enjoyed by other large organizations the new system had provided no significant military capability when they adopted an ERP system. Two years later it launched the beginning of its own ERP implementation, a system grandly titled the Expeditionary Combat Support System (ECSS). The ECSS was to be an Oracle system designed to replace 240 outdated information Senate investigations revealed three main problem areas .Cultural resistance to change within the Air Force . Inadequate mitigation of identified risks at the outset ck of leadership to implement needed chan stems used throughout the United States and overseas with a single ERP system. The proposed system would be about 30 times Military culture makes changing processes difficult. Investi than any system ever built by the Department of Defense gators found entrenched civil servants had a strong pride 00 times larger than any in the Air Force. Not only would the things are done, and military officers too quickly rotated between upply chain become more efficient and better managed, the new ERP would help the Air Force comply with new regulations requirthose parts flowed between bases in order to use the ERP sy ing federal agencies to produce auditable books by 2017 jobs. The AF had to change the way it purchased parts and how tem effectively, a disruptive change. They had to be willing to AF leadership failed. The leadership team had no prior experi Unfortunately the implementation of ECSS stumbled at nearlychange their business processes, but no culture of business process step. The Air Force failed to specify achievable objectives improvement existed every for the system, justifying the system with simplistic statements about how many different computer systems would be integrated Sadly, the number of information systems to be replaced grew from 240 initially to more than 900. injuri . ence with ERP systems, process change, or IT governance: were in over their heads. As mentioned, the system was pe Other self-inflected injuries 100 times larger than any system the Air Force had successt rha ps CASE STUDY 7 U.S. Air Force ERP Bonfire The U.S. Air Force operates a very large supply chain to sup- slowed progress. Air Force leaders did not execute a thorough workforce of more than 90,000 individuals, is managed by Mate- seemed to specify the desired capabilities of the new ERP system. riel Command (AFMC). AFMC is responsible for the purchasing, Finally, as the project lurched forward, far too much customization tracking, and use of thousands of parts and millions of gallons of was built into the ERP system as Air Force managers insisted that port its flying operations. This logistics mission, composed of agap analysis, too many leaders supervised the project, and no one the new ERP system needed to support existing proces than adopt the inherent processes offered by Oracle el at more than 150 installations worldwide. AFMC supports the Air Force, an organization with a yearly budget of about $165 bil- lion with about 300,000 service members. This makes it about the size of General Motors or General Electric After numerous setbacks and several failed attempts the program, in November 2012, the Air Force canceled the entire In 2003, Air Force leadership began to notice the marked project after spending $1.03 bllion. The Air Force concluded that improvement in logistics enjoyed by other large organizations the new system had provided no significant military capability when they adopted an ERP system. Two years later it launched the beginning of its own ERP implementation, a system grandly titled the Expeditionary Combat Support System (ECSS). The ECSS was to be an Oracle system designed to replace 240 outdated information Senate investigations revealed three main problem areas .Cultural resistance to change within the Air Force . Inadequate mitigation of identified risks at the outset ck of leadership to implement needed chan stems used throughout the United States and overseas with a single ERP system. The proposed system would be about 30 times Military culture makes changing processes difficult. Investi than any system ever built by the Department of Defense gators found entrenched civil servants had a strong pride 00 times larger than any in the Air Force. Not only would the things are done, and military officers too quickly rotated between upply chain become more efficient and better managed, the new ERP would help the Air Force comply with new regulations requirthose parts flowed between bases in order to use the ERP sy ing federal agencies to produce auditable books by 2017 jobs. The AF had to change the way it purchased parts and how tem effectively, a disruptive change. They had to be willing to AF leadership failed. The leadership team had no prior experi Unfortunately the implementation of ECSS stumbled at nearlychange their business processes, but no culture of business process step. The Air Force failed to specify achievable objectives improvement existed every for the system, justifying the system with simplistic statements about how many different computer systems would be integrated Sadly, the number of information systems to be replaced grew from 240 initially to more than 900. injuri . ence with ERP systems, process change, or IT governance: were in over their heads. As mentioned, the system was pe Other self-inflected injuries 100 times larger than any system the Air Force had successt rha ps
