answer the case questions please

Stewart, J. The petitioner, Scotr Hudgens, is the owner of the North DeKalb Shopping Center, located in suburban Atlanta, Ga. The center consists of a single large building with an enclosed mall. Surrounding the building is a parking area which an accommodate 2,640 automobiles. The shopping center house 60 retail stores leased to various businesses. One of the lessees is the Butler Shoe Co. Most of the stores, including Butler's, can be entered only from the interior mall. In January 1971, warchouse employees of the Butler Shoe Co, went on strike to protest the company's failure to agree to demands made by their union in contract negotiations. The strikers decided to picket not only Butler's warehouse but its nine retail stores in the Atlanta area as well, including the store in the North DeKalb Shopping Center. On January 22, 1971, four of the striking warchouse employees entered the center's enclosed mall carrying placards which read: "Butler Shoe Warehouse on Strike, AFL-CIO, Local 315, "The general manager of the shopping center informed the employees that they could not picket within the mall or on the parking lot and threatened them with arreat if they did not leave. The employees departed but returned a short time later and began picketing in an area of the mall immediately adjacent to the entrances of the Butler store. After the picketing had continued for approximately 30 minutes, the shopping center manager again informed the pickets that if they did not leave they would be arrested for trespaxing. The pickets departed. The union rubsequently filed with the Board an unfair Labor practice charge againat Hudgens, alleging interference with rights protected by Section 7 of the Act. Relying on this Court's decision in Fond Emploger a Logan Vallg Plasd, the Board entered a cesse-and-desist order against Hudgens, reasoning that because the warehouse employees enjoyed a Fint Amendment right to picket on the shopping center property, the owner's threat of arreat violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Hudgens filed a petition for review in the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Soon thereafter this Court decided Llogd Corp, an Tanner, and Contnal Handuare Ca \& NLRB, and the Court of Appeals remanded the case to the Board for reconsideration in light of those two decisions. The Board, in turn, remanded to an Administrative Law Judge, who made findingr of fact, recommendations, and conclusions to the effect that Hudgens had committed an unfair tabor practice by exduding the pickets. This roult was ostensibly reached under the statutory criteria set forth in NLRB u. Babcock of Wilcex Ca, a case which held that union organixers who seck to solicit for union membership may intrude on an employer's private properry if no alternative means exist for communicating with the employees, But the Administrative Law Judge's opinion also relied on the Court's constitutional decision in Logan Valley for a "realistic view of the facts." The Bory agreed with the findings and recommendations of the Administrative Law Judge, but departed somewhat from his reasoning. It concluded that the pickets were within the scope of Hudgens' invitation to members of the public to do business at the shopping center, and that it was, therefore, immaterial whether or not there existed an alternative means of communicating with the customen and employees of the Butler store. Hudgens again petitioned for review in the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and there the Board changed its ack and urged that the case was controlled not by Bubcock \& Wilcox, but by Rpublic Aviation Corp. In NLRB, a case which held that an employer commits an unfair labor practice if he enforces a no-solicitation rule against employes on his premises who are also union organizers, unless he can prove that the rule is necesitated by special circumatances. The Court of Appeals enforced the Board's cease-and-desist onder but on the basis of yet another theory. While acknowledging that the source of the pickets' tights was Section 7 of the Act, the Court of Appeals held that the competing constitutional and ner, "bunde[n] the General Counsel with the dury to ptove that other locations less intrusive upon Hudgens' property rights than picketing inside the mall were eirher unwailable or ineffective," and thut the Board's General Counsel had met thar bunden in this case. In this Court, the petirloner Hudgens continues to urge that Babrock \& Wilrex Ca is the controlling precedent, and that under the criteria of that case the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be reversed. The respondent union agrees that a starutory standard governs, but insists that, since the Section 7 activity here was not organiational as in Bafreck but picketing in support of a lawful economic strike, an appropriate accommodation of the competing interests must lead to an affirmance of the Court of Appeals' judgment. The ropondent Board now coatends that the conflict between employee picketing rights and employer property rights in a eare like this must be measured in accood with the commandr of the Fint Amendment, purruant to the Boandh anerred understanding of LggCorp. F Taser, and that the judgment of the Court of Appeals thould be affirmed on the batis of that atandard. As the above tecital discloses, the history of this litigation ha been a hintory of ahifting positions on the part of the litigants, the Board, and the Court of Appeals, It has been a history, in short, of considerable confusion, engendered at least in part by decinions of this Court that intervened during the course of the litigation. In the present ponture of the case the most basic question is whether the ropective rights and liabilities of the parties are to be decided under the criteria of the National Labor Relations Aet alone, under a Fint Amendment standard, or under some combination of the two. It is to that question, accondingly, that we now turn. It is, of course, a commonplace that the constirutional guarantec of free spech is a guarantee only against abridg: ment by government, fedcral or atate.... [The rights and tiabilities of the parties in this case are dependent exclusively upon the National Labor Relations Act. Under the Act the takk of the Boand, subject to review by the courts, is to revolve conflicrs between Section 7 rights and private property rights, "and to seck a proper accommodation berwecn the two," What is "a proper accommodation" in ain straation may largely depend upon the content and the context of the Section 7 rights beisg auerted. The task of the Bourd and the reviewing cours under the Act, therefore, stands in conspicuous contrast to the dury of a court in appilying the standande of the Fins Amendment. which requires "above all else" that expresion must not be reatriced by gorernment "because of its menuge, is ideas, its subject matter, or ins content:" In the Cranat Mandeurr case, and eartier in the case of NLRA n. Aabroch \& Whlrax Ca, the Court considered the nature of the Board's task in chis area under the Act. Accommodation between employeci' Section 7 rights and employeri' property rights, the Court suid in Babcock \& Whicox, "mun be obtained with as lirtle destruction of one as is consistent with the maintenance of the other." organiational activiry carried on by nonemployees on the comployer' property. The contex of the Section 7 activiry in the present case was different in several respects which may or muy not be relevant in ariking the proper balance. Firnt, it involved lawful economic atrike activity rather than organisational activiry. Second, the Section 7 activity here was carried on by Buter's employea (alteit not employees of its , hopping center store), not by outsiden. Thind, the property interents impinged upon in this case were not those of the employer against whom the Section 7 activity was directed. but of another. The Babreck \& Whirax opinion established the baic objective under the Act: accommodation of Section 7 righos and private property righes "with as litrle decruetion of one as is consistent with the maintenance of the other." The locus of that accommodation, however, may fall at differing points along the spectrum depending on the nature and strength of the repective Section 7 righes and private property righto anerted in any given context. In each gencric situation, the primary responsibility for making this accommodation must reat with the Bourd in the first instance.... For the reanons stated in this opinion, the jodgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals with directions to remand to the National Labor Relations Boand, so that the case may be rhere considered under the starutory criteria of the National Labor Relations Act alone. It is so ondered. Case Questions 1. Whit whom does the union have the dispute? Where is the union picketing? Who secka to prevent the union from pidacting there? What is the purpose of the union: picketing there? 2. Acconding to the Babcock of Wilcos decision (see Chapter 14), what facton ahould the court consider in determining whether a union can picket en private property? 3. Ase the picketers employers of Buter Shoe Ca? How does the picketing affect the empleyet' property righto