Answer the following questions regarding the matrix below, which represents the strategic interaction between the two largest movie production studios, Universal Pictures and 20lh Century Fox. They are each deciding the release dates for their own summer blockbuster action movies. They can release their movies in June, July, or August. Because of limited demand for going to the movies, each firm would generally rather release their movies earlier than later. Similarly, they would rather not release their movies at the same time, as it dilutes the demand for their movies. The matrix form of the game is as follows: June July August June 5,5 54 8,6 Universal July 4,6 5,5 6,5 August 7,8 4,6 5,4 Suppose Universal and Fox make their decisions simultaneously. Are there any Nash equilibria? If so, what are they? Show your work. Answer the following questions regarding the matrix below, which represents the strategic interaction between a rm whose operation has some negative impacts on the environemnt and a government agency in charge of regulating them and ensuring environmental protection. The government can develop a mandate using one of two technologies, or can adopt the industry's best practices as the standard in the mandate. The rm can either continue on with business as usual or develop one of those two technologies as well. If they are not in compliance with the government regulation, there is a cost of becoming so. If they are in compliance and the government adopts their practices, it provides the rm with a competitive advantage in the market. The Government Industry Best Tech. A Tech. B Practices Tech. A 13 , 10 The Firm Tech- B 10, 10 Business as 15 I 0 Usual (BAU) Answer the following two questions. Do the work with paper and pencil and submit it through the upload link provided once the exam has been completed. a. Are there any pure strategy Nash Equilibrium in the above game? Show your work and explain. b. Suppose the Firm moves first and communicates their action, turning this interaction into a sequential move game. First set up the game tree. Second, find the equilibrium path of the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome and conclude with why the Firm might want this to happen? Explain intuitively why or why not