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[32] Consider the following game, whereby player 1 moves rst, selecting either L or R. After player 1 moves, player 2 then moves, choosing either] or r. The game tree is depicted below: 4:3 3.1 4.2 5.5 Note: The players payoffs are listed at the bottom of the tree, with player l's payoffs listed rst and player 2's payoffs listed second. Utilizing backwards induction, the likely outcome is that: A. player 1 moves L and player 2 moves 1. B. player 1 moves L and player 2 ms r. C. player 1 moves R and player 2 moves 1. D. player 1 moves R and player 2 moves r. Use the following to answer questions (33) and (34): Two rms, A and B, must decide how much money to invest in research and development (in thousands of dollars). The following payoff matrix illustrates their choices (with A's payoffs listed rst and B's payoffs listed second): 100: 10,3 0,4 5,0 3,2 B 200: 5,0 12,5 0,0 0,4 300: 3,0 0,-3 5,12 4,0 Note: Payoffs are in millions of dollars. Also, the two rms move simultaneously and have complete information. [33] If both players select 5200 thousand as the research and development investment, this will coincide with a Nash Equilibrium. A. True B. False [34] This game has _ Nash Equilihria. A. one B. two C. three D- four