Assume 1/3 of workers have low, 1/3 medium, and 1/3 high productivity, denoted as el, em, eh, respectively, where el < em < eh. Firms do not know how productive workers are. Education may serve as a signaling device. The total cost of acquiring y years of education is ciy for i {l, m, h}, where ch < cm < cl. The utility for a worker is given by Ui(w, y) = w ciy for i {l, m, h}, where w denotes wage. Firms are competitive, and pay workers a wage equal to their (expected) productivity. a) Draw a typical indifference curve (with education on the horizontal axis and wage on the vertical axis) for a "low productivity" (type l) and for a "high productivity"(type h) worker on the same graph. Briefly describe what explains the difference.