1. Assume a Hawk -Dove game with the following payoff matrix, where the first entry is Animal A's payoff, and the second entry is Animal B's payoff:

Animal A (rows)/Animal B (columns)	Hawk	Dove
Hawk	(-5,-5)	(10,0)
Dove	(0,10)	(4,4)

An animal that plays Hawk will always fight until it wins or is badly hurt. An animal that plays Dove makes a bold display but retreats if his opponent starts to fight. If two Dove animals meet they share.

a) Derive a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE). What is the proportion of Hawks and Doves? If the proportion of Hawks in the population of animals is greater than the mixed strategy equilibrium proportion you calculated, which strategy does better, Hawks of Doves? Explain your answer. (3 marks)