Question
Assume that there are three members of a voting body with preferences (O,A,N), (A,O,N), and (N,A,O).Assume that decisions are made according to the plurality procedure,
Assume that there are three members of a voting body with preferences (O,A,N), (A,O,N), and (N,A,O).Assume that decisions are made according to the plurality procedure, and voter (O,A,N) is the chair with a tie-breaking vote.What are the sincere and sophisticated outcomes (give the matrix calculations for sophisticated voting)?Is one of these outcomes a Condorcet alternative?
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Classics In Game Theory
Authors: Harold William Kuhn
1st Edition
1400829151, 9781400829156
