Assume that we have an entry situation like that in the Judo Economics example. There is an incumbent firm (I) and a new entrant (E). Now we will look at the outcome if the entrant is at a disadvantage. The incumbent has constant marginal costs of production of $100, while marginal costs for the entrant are $120 per unit. There are 100 identical buyers who are willing to pay $200 for the incumbents product, but only $160 to buy from the entrant. Overall, buyers will pay $40 more for the incumbents product. Any consumer can buy from the incumbent, but only those targeted by the entrant can buy from the entrant. Those consumers targeted by the entrant can choose to buy from the incumbent or the entrant and will choose the lowest price (with the incumbent winning ties). At the first move of the game the entrant decides how many consumers (N) to target and sets a single price (P) to those targeted consumers. The incumbent then sets a single price for all 100 consumers, deciding to defend the market or accommodate the new entrant. Consumers then purchase the good. How many consumers should the entrant target, and what is the optimal price? What are the incumbents profits in this scenario?