Question
Assume valuations of the bidders: v1> v2>> vn.(1). n has the lowest valuation of all the bidders. How to find NE for second-price sealed-bid auction
Assume valuations of the bidders: v1> v2>> vn.(1). n has the lowest valuation of all the bidders. How to find NE for second-price sealed-bid auction that player n could obtains the object? (NE=nash equilibrium)
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Financial Reporting And Analysis
Authors: Lawrence Revsine, Daniel Collins, Bruce Johnson, Fred Mittelstaedt, Leonard Soffer
8th Edition
1260247848, 978-1260247848
