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Assume valuations of the bidders: v1> v2>> vn.(1). n has the lowest valuation of all the bidders. How to find NE for second-price sealed-bid auction

Assume valuations of the bidders: v1> v2>> vn.(1). n has the lowest valuation of all the bidders. How to find NE for second-price sealed-bid auction that player n could obtains the object? (NE=nash equilibrium)

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