b. Assume that the claim satisfied the requiremer jurisdiction. May the Plaintiff and Defendant agree that, Hawaii relaxing location, they will just let the federal court in Hawaii meduplicate the clos even though neither the parties nor the claim have any relationship to the stat. Hawaii? C. Do the answers to (a) and (b) explain what is meant by, personal jurisdiction by not subject matter jurisdiction is waivable," and why the existence of persong jurisdiction over a plaintiff is usually a nonissue? 4. Does personal jurisdiction in a federal court over a defendant sometimes depend on whether a state court in the state where the federal court is located would have persojon jurisdiction over the defendant? Read Rule 4(k)(1)(A) carefully to answer this question 5. Rule 4(k)(1)(A) demonstrates that service of process alone is not enough to establish personal jurisdiction over a defendant, but rather it is service of process over a defendash who is "subject to the jurisdiction" of the court. What, apart from a lack of notice, might render Francine not "subject to the jurisdiction" of the federal court in Florida? FED. R. CIV. P. 4 (k) TERRITORIAL LIMITS OF EFFECTIVE SERVICE. 1) In General. Serving a summons or filing a waiver of service establishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant: (A) who is subject to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located; (B) who is a party joined under Rule 14 or 19 and is served within a judicial district of the United States and not more than 100 miles from where the summons was issued; or ova(C) when authorized by a federal statute. (2) Federal Claim Outside State-Court Jurisdiction. For a claim that arises under federal law, serving a summons or filing a waiver of service establishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant if: (A) the defendant is not subject to jurisdiction in any state's courts of general jurisdiction; and (B) exercising jurisdiction is consistent with the United States Constitution and laws. addmore sandmod toryCH. 16 PERSONAL JURISDICTION 219 I. THE STATE POWER THEORY PENNOYER V. NEFF (1877) Supreme Court of the United States 95 U.S. 714 mere are State over persons principles of public law respecting the jurisdiction indepencein every respect ons and property. The severi states of the Unionich of it is wronged to them independent, many of the right and powers w the not mally belong exceptas ropeing now vested in the government created byand arifatitution. thority of indenverained and limited by that instrument, they possesswhich coolsige the auto are applicapendent States, and the principles of public law to What xero ve referrevelin all able to them. One of these principles is, that every suits we bosses excitconsequence and sovereignty over persons and property with posseory . As a Citiesofitce. every State has the power to determine for itself the " terri's and capaonse and solomapitants; to prescribe the subjects upon which they " contract, the forms and soler solemnities with which their contracts shall be executed, the cones and oblig theirhang from them, and the mode in which their validity shall be fermined and their obligations enforced; and also the regul regulate the manner and detaitions upon en property situated within such territory both personal and read may be acquired, enjoyed, and transferred. The other principle of public law referred to follows from the one mentioned; that is at no State can easeise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or propthe thehout its territory. The several States are of equal dignity and authority, and the independence of one implies th es the exclusion of power from all others. And so it is iadd in diurists, as an elementary principle, that the laws of one State have no operation by side of its territory, except so far as is allowed by comity; and that no tribunal out blished by it can extend its process beyond that territory so as to subject either Persons or property to its decisions. 'Any exertion of authority of this sort sort beyond this perit ' says Story, is, a mere nullity, and incapable of binding such persons or property In any other tribunals.' But as contracts made in one State may be enforceable only in another State, and inperty may be held by non-residents, the exercise of the jurisdiction which every State Padmitted to possess over persons and property within its own territory will often affect irsons and property without it. To any influence exerted in this way by a State affecting Persons resident or property situated elsewhere, no objection can be justly taken; whilst Pay direct exertion of authority upon them, in an attempt to give ex-territorial operation its laws, or to enforce an ex-territorial jurisdiction by its tribunals, would be deemed "encroachment upon the independence of the State in which the persons are domiciled or the property is situated, and be resisted as usurpation. Thus the State, through its tribunals, may compel persons domiciled within its imits to execute, in pursuance of their contracts respecting property elsewhere situated, struments in such form and with such solemnities as to transfer the title, so far as such rmalities can be complied with; and the exercise of this jurisdiction in no manner terferes with the supreme control over the property by the State within which it is uated.CH. 16 PERSONAL JURISDICTION 221 10. Pennoyer was a case decided in 1877. The next case, International Shoe, was decided in court to state: 1945. Explain what changed between 1877 and 1945, prompting the International Shoe Historically the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personam is grounded on their de facto power over the defendant's person. Hence his presence within the territorial jurisdiction of court was prerequisite to its rendition of a judgment personally binding him. Pennoyer v. Neff. But now . . . due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' II. MINIMUM CONTACTS AND PURPOSEFUL AVAILMENT A. THE ORIGIN OF MINIMUM CONTACTS INTERNATIONAL SHOE CO. V. WASHINGTON (1945) Supreme Court of the United States 326 U.S. 310 MR. CHIEF JUSTICE STONE delivered the opinion of the Court. the limitations of the due proc220 PERSONAL JURISDICTION CH So the State, through its tribunals, may subject property situated within its lip 10 owned by non-residents to the payment of the demand of its own argue against the and the exercise of this jurisdiction in no respect infringes upedone sovereignty of State where the owners are domiciled. Every State owes protection to its own citing and, when non-residents deal with them, it is a legitimate and ing the cise of authings to hold and appropriate any property owned by such non-real the po satisfy the clarity of it's citizens. It is in virtue of the State's jurisdiction over the property of the nis resident situated within its limits that its tribunals can inquireme that non-resident obligations to its own citizens, and the inquiry can then be Gagaga only to the exnt's necessary to control the disposition of the property. If the non-resident have nope in the State, there is nothing upon which the tribunals can adjudicate. o property These views are not new. They have been frequently expresses, with more or less distinctness, in opinions of eminent judges, and have been carried into adjudicationess numerous cases. Thus, in Picquet v. Swan, Mr. Justice Story said:- Where a party is within a territory, he may justly be subjected to its process and bound personally by the judgment pronounced on such process against him' where he is not within such territory, and is not personally subject to its laws; if, on account of his supposed or actual property being within the territory process by the local laws may, by attachment, go to compel his appearance. for his default to appear judgment may be pronounced against him, s Judgment must, upon general principles, be deemed only to bind him to t extent of such property, and cannot have the effect of a conclusive judgment personam, for the plain reason, that, except so far as the property is concerned it is a judgment coram non judice.' And in Boswell's Lessee v. Otis, where the title of the plaintiff in eject acquired on a sheriff's sale, under a money decree rendered upon publication of notes ejectment was Mclean said:- against non-residents, in a suit brought to enforce a contract relating to land, Mr. Justice Jurisdiction is acquired in one of two modes: first, as against the person of the defendant by the service of process; or, secondly, by a procedure against the property of the defendant within the jurisdiction of the court. In the latter case the defendant is not personally bound by the judgment beyond the property in question. And it is immaterial whether the proceeding against the property by an attachment or bill in chancery. It must be substantially a proceeding in rem.' DIRECTED READING QUESTIONS 6. What are the two principles of public law that the Pennoyer case articulates? 7 . How do these two principles reflect limits on the power of the states, relative to each other? 8. When, according to Pennoyer, may a state exercise personal jurisdiction over persons and property outside of its borders? 9. The Pennoyer case recognizes that, "Jurisdiction is acquired in one of two modes ." Explain what these modes are