B.) Draft a case illustration for the same case of Perseus, Inc. v. Canody, 995 S.W. 2d 202 (Tex. App. 1999).

Do not discuss summary judgment or substantial evidence. Do not discuss the safe harbor defense in case illustration. Instead, limit it to the obvious intoxication element. It must contain the following parts:

a.) hook

b.) rule

c.) trigger facts

d.) the court's holding

e.) the court's reasoning

Perseus, Inc. v. Canody, 995 S.W.2d 202 {1999} KeyCite Yellow Flag Negative Treatment Distinguished by Toledo v. Silver Eagle Distributors, L.P.. Tex.App_Hous. (1 Dist.), January 10, 2013 995 S.W.2d 202 Court of Appeals of Texas, San Antonio. PERSEUS, INC. dfbi'a Hippodrome, Appellant, v. Debbie CANODY, individually and as representative of the Estate of Alisha Martin, and Gloria Tijerina and Larry Tijerina, individually and as representatives of the Estate of Ruben Tijerina, deceased, Appellees. No. 04-9700760CV. | March 31, 1999. | Rehearing Overruled May 25, 1999. Synopsis Parents of pedestrians killed by drunk driver led wrongful death action against driver and owner and operator of nightclub where he had been drinking prior to accident. The 37th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Martha Tanner, J., entered judgment on jury verdict in favor of parents. Nightclub owner appealed. The Court of Appeals, Stone, J., held that: (l) Dram Shop Act's imposition of liability when it is \"apparent to the provider\" that patron is obviously intoxicated does not require that provider actually witness intoxicated behavior; (2) evidence was sufficient to infer that customer's intoxication had been \"apparent to the provider\"; and [3) evidence supported inferences that not all employees working at nightclub were certied and that owner indirectly encouraged employees to violate law by serving alcohol to obviously intoxicated patrons, which thus precluded protection of Act's safe harbor. Afrmed. '.'. .= s. r | West Headnote s (12) [1| [2| [3| [4] Appeal and Error .- Legal sufficiency or \"no evidence" in general In attacking the evidentiary support for an issue on which a party did not have the burden of proof, the party must demonstrate on appeal that there is no evidence or merely a scintilla of evidence to support the finding. Appeal and Error -. Review for factual or legal sufficiency; \"no evidence\" review In considering a \"no evidence" or legal sufficiency point, the reviewing court considers only the evidence and reasonable inferences favorable to the decision of the trier of fact and disregards all evidence and inferences to the contrary. Appeal and Error . -- Manifest weight; manifestly contrary When considering a factual sufficiency point, the reviewing court assesses all the evidence and reverses for a new trial only if the challenged finding is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust. Appeal and Error . Jury as factfmder below in general Appeal and Error -. Jury as factfmder below Appeal and Error Jury as factfmder below It is for the jury, not the reviewing court, to judge the credibility of the evidence, as sign the weight to be given to testimony, and resolve conicts or inconsistencies. 1 Case that cites this headnote Perseus, Inc. v. Canody, 995 S.W.2d 202 {1999} [5] l6] l7] l3] Alcoholic Beverages -. Unlawful provision of alcohol to intoxicated or alcoholic persons Dram Shop Act's imposition of liability when it is \"apparent to the provider" that a patron is obviously intoxicated does not require evidence that the provider actually witnessed the intoxicated behavior, but rather only that the conduct is visible, evident, and easily observed. V.T.C.A_, Alcoholic Beverage Code 2.02. 5 Cases that cite this headnote Alcoholic Beverages -;- Unlawful provision of alcohol to intoxicated or alcoholic persons Dram Shop Act's imposition of liability when it is apparent to the provider that a patron is obviously intoxicated does not necessarily require subjective intent on the part of the provider to continue serving an intoxicated patron even assuming that Act completely eliminated common law standard of imposing liability when a provider knows or should know a patron is intoxicated. V.T.C.A., Alcoholic Beverage Code 2.02. 1 Case that cites this headnote Alcoholic Beverages Weight and Sufficiency Even assuming that Dram Shop Act's imposition of liability when it is apparent to the provider that a patron is intoxicated is a subjective standard, it does not supercede a jury's right to weigh evidence, assess the credibility of witnesses, and draw reasonable inferences 'om the evidence, nor does it eliminate the rule that a disputed fact may be proved by circumstantial evidence. V.T.C.A.= Alcoholic Beverage Code 2.02. 2 Cases that cite this headnote Alcoholic Beverages Presumptions= Inferences, and Burden of Proof Automobiles -.' Alcoholic Beverages Evidence was legally and factually sufficient to infer that customer's intoxication had been \"apparent to the provider\" within meaning of '. 'v' .' "{ T | .1" 'v".' [9] [10] [Ill Dram Shop Act so as to support liability of nightclub owner for customer's subsequent automobile accident in which two pedestrians were killed; customer drank seven or eight malt liquors in nightclub, stumbled on dance floor, was generally unsteady on his feet, slurred his speech, had bloodshot eyes, and was at the bar in intoxicated state during purchase of some of his drinks. V_T.C.A., Alcoholic Beverage Code 2.02. 1 Case that cites this headnote Alcoholic Beverages -. Safe harbor By its plain temls, Dram Shop Act's safe harbor provisions providing affirmative defense of provider against liability for actions of its employee applies to civil actions brought under Act. V.T.C.A., Alcoholic Beverage Code N 2.03, 106.14(a). Appeal and Error -. Entire record In reviewing the jury's rejection of the affirmative defense under the safe harbor provision of the Drarn Shop Act, an appellate court must first examine the record for evidence supporting the jury's answer, and only if there no evidence to support the jury's answer will the court review the entire record to determine if the contrary position is established as a matter of law. VT.C.A., Alcoholic Beverage Code 106.l4[a). 1 Case that cites this headnote Alcoholic Beverages -; Defenses and mitigating circ urnstances Automobiles . Alcoholic Beverages Evidence supported inference that not all employees working at nightclub were certified to sell alcoholic beverages, which thus precluded nightclub owner from protection of safe harbor under Dram Shop Act from liability for its employees' actions in serving alcohol to customer who subsequently killed two pedestrians in car accident; general manager admitted that there could have been employees on duty for whom she did not have certication Perseus, Inc. v. Canody, 995 S.W.2d 202 (1999) records and that it was possible that non-certified employee served alcoholic beverages on night in CATHERINE STONE, Justice. question. V.T.C.A., Alcoholic Beverage Code $ 106.14(a). This appeal from a jury's verdict in a wrongful death case raises issues regarding the Dram Shop Act and the statutory 1 Case that cites this headnote safe harbor" defense which protects purveyors of alcohol who take certain precautions to ensure that intoxicated individuals are not served. [12] Alcoholic Beverages Defenses and mitigating circumstances Ruben Tijerina and his fiancee, Alisha M. Martin, were killed Automobiles Alcoholic Beverages by a drunk driver as they walked along the shoulder of a Evidence supported inference that nightclub road in San Antonio. The surviving parents of Tijerina and owner indirectly encouraged its employees to Martin sued Sam Selman, the intoxicated driver, and Perseus, violate law by serving alcohol to obviously Inc., the owner and operator of the Hippodrome-the night intoxicated patrons, which thus precluded club where Selman had been drinking prior to the accident. nightclub owner from protection of Dram Shop The jury found that Selman was 65 percent responsible for Act's safe harbor from liability for employees' the deaths, and that Perseus was 35 percent responsible. actions in serving alcohol to customer who A defensive issue regarding the "safe harbor" provision subsequently killed two pedestrians while specified in the Texas Alcohol and Beverage Code was driving home; nightclub policy directed rejected by the jury. Damages in excess of two million dollars employees to serve "light" drinks or not at all if were awarded to the surviving family members. On appeal customer showed signs of becoming intoxicated, we are concerned with the liability and defenses of Perseus and expert testimony suggested employees failed only. Perseus contends the evidence is legally and factually to enforce other policies concerning treatment insufficient to support the jury's finding that it was negligent of intoxicated customer. V.T.C.A., Alcoholic under tex. Alco. Bev. Code Ann. $ 2.02 (Vernon 1995) (the Beverage Code $ 106.14(a). Dram Shop Act). Perseus also claims that it established its right to its affirmative defense under tex. Alco. Bev.Code 1 Case that cites this headnote Ann. $ 106.14(a) (Vernon 1995) (the "safe harbor" defense). Because the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the liability finding, and because Perseus failed to establish its entitlement to the protections of the "safe harbor" *203 Appeal from the 37th Judicial District Court, Bexar defense, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. County, Trial Court No. 94-CI-4882; Martha Tanner, Judge Presiding. Attorneys and Law Firms Factual Background Thomas F. Nye, Linda C. Breck, Brin & Brin, P.C., Corpus On the evening of March 20, 1994, Sam Selman arrived at Christi, for Appellant. the Hippodrome night club for an evening of socializing with friends. Testimony revealed that Selman appeared intoxicated Thomas C. Hall, Hall & Bates, L.L.P., San Antonio, Paul when he arrived, that he continued to drink for the several Anderson, Jr., *204 James B. Lewis, Glover, Anderson, hours he was at the club, and that he appeared intoxicated Chandler & Uzick, L.L.P., Peter M. Kelly, Miller Criaco when he departed the club shortly after midnight. In fact, Kelly, Houston, for Appellee. about an hour before he left the club, one of his companions attempted to give him twenty dollars to take a cab home. Before ALMA L. LOPEZ, Justice, CATHERINE STONE, Despite his condition, Selman did not take a taxi; instead, Justice and SARAH B. DUNCAN, Justice. he drove his own vehicle home. The fatal accident occurred during his drive home. OPINION WESTLAW @ 2022 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.Perseus, Inc. v. Canody, 995 S.W.2d 202 {1999] negligence and Praxirnate Cause The Dram Shop Act Under Texas law, a provider of alcoholic beverages can be held liable for damages sustained by innocent third parties resulting from a patron's intoxication. As specied in the Dram Shop Act: (b) Providing, selling, or serving an alcoholic beverage may be made the basis of a statutory cause of action upon proof that: (l) at the time the provision occurred it was apparent to the provider that the individual being sold, served, or provided with an alcoholic beverage was obviously intoxicated to the extent that he presented a clear danger to himself and others; and (2) the intoxication of the recipient of the alcoholic beverage was a proximate cause of the damages suffered. tex. Alco. Bev.Code Ann. 2.02 (Vernon 1995). *205 The Jury Question This language from the Dram Shop Act was tracked in question two of the court's charge, which inquired as follows: As to Perseus, Inc., \"Negligence\" means providing, under authority of a license, an alcoholic beverage to Sam Selman III when it is apparent to the provider that the recipient is obviously intoxicated to the extent that he presents a clear danger to himself and others. You are instructed that negligence, if any, as to Perseus, Inc. was a proximate cause of the occurrence in question if Selman's intoxication was a proximate cause of the occurrence in question. Did the negligence, if any, of those named below proximately cause the occurrence made the basis of this suit? In response to this question the jury found that both Perseus and Selman were negligent. The jury attributed 35 percent negligence to Perseus and 65 percent to Selman. The Standard of Review On appeal Perseus challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's answer to question two. Specically, Perseus claims there is no evidence, or insufficient evidence, to establish that it was apparent to Hippodrome employees when they provided alcoholic beverages to Selman that Selman was obviously intoxicated and that he presented a clear danger to himself and others. [1] [21 [31 I41 Perseus is attacking the evidentiary support for an issue on which it did not have the burden of proof. Under such circumstances Perseus must demonstrate on appeal that there is no evidence or merely a scintilla of evidence to support the nding. Croadier v. Cmachei; 660 SW2d 55, 58 [Tex.1983). In considering a \"no evidence" or legal sufciency point, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences favorable to the decision of the trier of fact and disregard all evidence and inferences to the contrary. Davis v. City: ofSaii Antonio, 752 SW2d 5181= 522 (Tex.1988]; Garza v. Alviai; 395 S.W.2d 821. 823 (Tex.1965). When we consider a factual sufficiency point, we assess all the evidence and reverse for a new hial only if the challenged nding is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust. Poo! v. Fora'Moior Ca, 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 [Tex.1986); Cain 1". Barn, 709 S.W'.2d 175, 176 (Tex.1986); In re King's Estate, 150 Tex. 662. 244 SW2d 660, 661 (1951). In conducting our review, we are mindful that it is for the Jury, not this court, to judge the credibility of the evidence, assign the weight to be given to testimony, and resolve conflicts or inconsistencies. Corpus Christi Teachers Credit Union v. Hernandez, 814 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex.App. San Antonio 1991, no writ). Evidentiary Review Sam Selman had no recollection of his evening at the Hippodrome, so he was of no assistance in recreating the events ofthe night. Two of his companions, however, testied that he arrived at the Hippodrome intoxicated and drank throughout the night. Brian Murphy testied that when Selman arrived at the Hippodrome at approximately 9:45 in the evening, it appeared that he had already been drinking. During the course of the evening Murphy saw Selman drink at least seven or eight malt liquors. Murphy testified that another friend, lake, was buying drinks for Selman. Murphy was not sure if Selman also drank shots when he was at the bar with Jake buying drinks. Murphy indicated that throughout the evening there was an on-going discussion or argument with Selman about his ability to drive home. As described by Murphy, \"We argued all the way to the door." Murphy attempted to give Selman $20 to take a taxi home, but Selman would not accept the money. Murphy described Selman's intoxicated condition as "obvious to anyone there," noting In challenging the liability finding, Perseus, Inc. v. Canody, 995 S.W.2d 202 {1999] that Selman stumbled on the dance oor, was generally unsteady on *206 his feet, slurred his speech, and had bloodshot eyes. Another of Selman's friends, Larry Schnepp, testified to essentially the same facts as Murphy. Schnepp, who does not drink at all, described both Selman and Jake as \"heavy drinkers.\" He saw Selman and Jake order two drinks from the waitress, and he thought that Selman paid the waitress himself for at least one drink. Selman and Jake ordered a third drink at the bar, and Schnepp thought that Selman and Jake were also \"doing shots\" at the bar. Schnepp stated that he could tell that Selman was drunk because of the way he was walking. slurring his speech. and acting weird. He did state, however, that if he had never met Selman before and saw him on the evening in question at the Hippodrome, he might not have thought it was obvious that Selman had consumed too much alcohol. Schnepp was also concerned about Selman's ability to drive because there was no doubt in his mind that Selman was too drunk to drive. Dr. Oscar Dorsey, majority shareholder of Perseus, testified that if Sehnan exhibited the kind of behavior described by Murphy and Schnepp, then Perseus employees should have seen the behavior and stopped providing drinks. In Dorsey's view, the failure to do so would be negligence, or as he described it, someone was not doing their job. In contrast to the testimony of Murphy and Schnepp, Perseus relied upon the testimony of several other witnesses who indicated that it was possible that no Hippodrome employee ever saw Selman act intoxicated. Terry Reichel, a manager at the Hippodrome, testified that he never saw an employee serve alcohol to an obviously intoxicated patron.3 Similarly, Roy Kirkpatrick, a consultant and TABC trainer, testified that he had seen no evidence that Selman in any way revealed signs of intoxication in front of a Hippodrome employee. Specically, Kirkpatrick stated that he saw no evidence that Selman was unsteady on his feet, fell from a bar stool, or had difficulty making change. Perseus relies on the testimony of these witnesses to argue that appellees failed to establish a violation of the Dram Shop Act because there is no direct testimony that a Hippodrome employee actually observed the classic signs of intoxication referred to by Murphy and Schnepp. We reject Perseus' argument on several grounds. [5] First, while the statute imposes liability when it is \"apparent to the provider\" a patron is obviously intoxicated, we do not believe the statute requires evidence that the provider actually witnessed the intoxicated behavior. We give statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning unless the statute provides otherwise. See Tex. Gthode Ann. 312.002(a) (Vernon 1998). As noted by appellees, \"apparen \" means \"That which is obvious, evident, or manifest; what appears, or has been made manifest. That which appears to the eye or mind; open to view; plain; patent.\" Black's Law Dictionary 38 [5th ed. 1979). It is not the actual observation of conduct that makes the conduct \"apparent.\" Rather, conduct is apparent when it is visible, evident, and easily observed. Were we to construe the statutory \"apparent to the provider\" requirement as Perseus requests, then a provider of alcohol could always escape liability by merely turning a blind eye to signs of intoxication that are plain. manifest. and open to view. Surely this is not what the Legislature intended when it enacted legislation to hold providers responsible when they serve obviously intoxicated individuals. [6] [7] Second, even if we assume, as Perseus argues, that the Dram Shop Act has completely eliminated the common law *207 standard of imposing liability when a provider "knows or should know\" a patron is intoxicated, that does not mean that the \"apparent to the provider\" statutory standard requires a subjective intent on the part of the provider to continue serving an intoxicated patron. Compare E! Chico Corp. v. Poole, 732 SW2d 306, 314 (Tex.l987) [alcoholic beverage licensee is negligent when serving alcoholic beverages to patron who licensee knows or should know is intoxicated) with tex. Alco. Bev.Code Ann. 2.02 (b)(1) (Vernon 1995) (alcoholic beverage provider is liable when serving alcoholic beverages to a patron when it was apparent to provider that individual was obviously intoxicated). Even if we view the statutory stande as a subjective standard, it does not supercede a jury's right to weigh evidence, assess the credibility of witnesses, and draw reasonable inferences from the evidence. See Hammeriy Oaks, inc. v. Edwards, 958 S_W_2d 33?. 392 (Tex.1997); Eras Employvers'brs. A55 in 1". Jackson, 719 SW2d 245, 249 50 (Tex.App.El Paso 1986, writ ret'd rue]. Likewise, a subjective standard does not eliminate the rule that a disputed fact may be proved by circumstantial evidence. See Bfounf v. Bordeiis, Inc, 910 S.W.2d 931, 933 (Tex.1995); Prudential his. Co. of'Am. v. Krayer: 366 S.W.2d 779, 780 [Tex.1963). [8] Here, the record contains evidence from which the jury could infer that Selman's intoxication was \"apparent to the provider.\" As noted, the jury learned that Selman drank seven or eight malt liquors in the bar, stumbled on the dance oor, was generally unsteady on his feet, slurred his speech, and had bloodshot eyes. Indeed, Murphy indicated that Selman's intoxicated state was \"obvious to anyone there.\" Perseus, Inc. v. Canody, 995 S.W.2d 202 {1999] Moreover, although Sehnan's friend Jake had purchased most of Selman's drinks, testimony places Selman at the bar in an intoxicated state during some of the purchases. Thus, from this testimony, the jury could infer that Selman's intoxicated state was \"visible, evident, and easily observed\" by the provider. Finding legally and factually sufficient evidence to support the jury's answer to Question 2, we overrule Perseusr second issue. the Safe Harbor Defense [9] In its first claim of error, Perseus contends that it proved its affirmative defense under tex. Alco. Bev.Code Ann. 106.1401) [Vernon 1995) as a matter of law. This statutory provision, also known as the "safe harbor" defense, provides as follows: (a) For purposes of this chapter and any other provision of this code relating to the sales, service, dispensing, or delivery of alcoholic beverages to a minor or an intoxicated person or the consumption of alcoholic beverages by a minor or intoxicated person, the actions of an employee shall not be attributable to the employer if: (1) the employer requires its employees to attend a commission approved seller training program; (2) the employee has actually attended such a training program; and (3) the employer has not directly or indirectly encouraged the employee to violate such law. Id. If all three elements of this affirmative defense are established, a plaintiff's recovery is barred. Pena v. Neat, 901 SW2d 663, 667 (Tex.App.San Antonio 1995. writ denied) This defensive issue was submitted to the jury, which found that Perseus failed to comply with the statute.4 *203 [10] affnmative defense, we must first examine the record In reviewing the jury's rejection of this for evidence supporting the jury's answer. See Sterner v. .Marm'hort 0!! Ca. 767 S.VV.2d 686. 690 (Tcx.1989). Only if there no evidence to support the jury's answer will we review the entire record to determine if the contrary position is established as a matter of law. Victoria Bank & Trust Co. 1: Brady, 311 S.W.2d 931. 940(Tex.l991). Required Attendance At Seller Training On appeal, there seems to be no dispute that Perseus, at least as a matter of general policy, required all of its employees to attend TABC approved seller training. App ellees produced no evidence to counter Dr. Dorsey's testimony that all employees were required to be TABC certified. The dispute is whether Perseus proved that all employees on duty on the night in question were in fact TABC certied. In keeping with the appropriate standard of review, we will review the evidence regarding the general policy of required seller training attendance only if we determine that there is no evidence to support the jury's decision on one of the other elements of the safe harbor defense. See Sterner: 767 S.W.2d at 690. Actual Attendance At Seller Training [11] Appellees contend Perseus failed to establish that all employees working at the Hippodrome on the night of the accident were in fact TABC certified. The testimony of Evea Haass, daughter of Dr. Dorsey and general manager of the company hired to manage the Hippodrome, was offered by Perseus to establish that all employees on duty on the night of the accident were TABC certified. Appellees offered testimony from her two pre-trial depositions in an effort to impeach her trial testimony. According to her deposition testimony, she was living in New York City from March to August of 1994.5 Haass further testified that her sister, Carroll Dorsey, took over as general manager while she was in New York.(' Although she was the general manager, Haass testified that day-to-day operations at the Hippodrome were handled by other managers, and admitted that she could not state which employees were working at the club on a specific date, such as the date of the accident. In fact, Haass could not say who could verify the complete roster of employees on duty on the night in question. Haass reviewed the employee time cards and records for persons she believed were employed at the Hippodrome on the night in question. These records, which revealed TABC certicates for each employee, were retrieved om a file by her secretary. In deposition testimony Haass could not verify that the records were made and maintained in the ordinary course of business, although at trial she testified that the records were maintained by the Hippodrome under the custody of Hippodrome employees. The records were admitted over objection as business records. Appellees note that Haass was unable to state unequivocally that the records she had covered all the persons on duty on March 2021. Stating that \"anything was possible," Haass admitted that there could have been other employees on duty that night whose records she did not have. Haass further admitted it Perseus, Inc. v. Canody, 995 S.W.2d 202 {1999] was a possibility that a non-certified employee had served alcoholic beverages at the Hippodrome. Appellees further note that Dr. Dorsey and Haass testied that they were locked out of the Hippodrome in a dispute with the landlord and when they were later allowed access to the club's property, some records were lost. There was also at *209 least one break in where the records were maintained. Haassl testimony does not establish as a matter of law that all employees on duty on the night in question were in fact TABC certified. While this court may have decided this factual dispute differently, we do not sit as thirteenth jurors, and it is the jury's function, not this court's, to resolve the discrepancies in the testimony. See Vcnetoulr'as v. O'Brien, 909 s_w.2d 236, 240 (Tex.App.Iloustor1 [14th Dist] 1995, writ disrn'd by agr]. Based upon the evidence presented, the jury could have reasonably inferred that not all Hippodrome employees were certified, and could have rejected the safe harbor defense on that basis. Encouragement To Violate The Law [12] Hippodrome reveal inconsistencies that allowed the jury to Appellees contend the written policies of the determine the Hippodrome indirectly encouraged violation of applicable liquor laws. For example, the section of the policies specifying grounds for employee tennination lists serving alcohol to a minor as grounds for termination, but fails to include serving alcohol to an intoxicated person.'T Another section of the policies entitled "Grounds for Immediate Termination," makes no mention of serving either minors or intoxicated persons. In a separate section devoted to "Intoxicated Customers," the policies advise that employees cannot allow customers to become intoxicated at the club, and state that any employee "serving a drink to an intoxicated customer is subject to immediate dismissal.\" However, in listing specific steps that employees can take to prevent customers from becoming intoxicated, the policies state that \"[i]f a customer shows signs of becoming intoxicated serve them 'light' drinks or not at all.\" This policy alone provided Footnotes the jury with a basis to detennine that the Hippodrome indirectly encouraged its employees to serve alcohol, albeit watered-down alcohol, to intoxicated persons. Dr. Dorsey testified that policies were irrelevant in the absence of enforcement. He admitted that if Selman appeared as intoxicated as his companions testied he was, then his employees should have \"spotted it" and followed the policies. Dr. Jim Calder, an industrial security expert, testified that the Hippodrome failed to enforce its written policies when its employees allowed Selman to enter the club in an intoxicated condition, failed to monitor his behavior in the club, failed to stop serving him alcohol, and allowed him to leave the club in an intoxicated condition. In Dr. Calder's opinion, the failure to enforce appropriate policies evidenced an indirect encouragement to violate the law. Encouragement to violate liquor laws by serving an intoxicated person \"may take many subtle forms." Gonzalez v. South Dallas Club, 951 S.W.2d 72, 77 (Tex.App.Corpus Christi 199?, no writ). Given the inconsistencies in the policies as outlined above, and the unobjected-to testimony of Dr. Calder, we hold that the jury could reasonably infer that Perseus indirectly encouraged its employees to violate the law, thereby precluding the protection of the safe harbor defense. Perseus failed to establish as a matter of law its entitlement to the safe harbor defense, and the jury's failure to find in favor of Perseus on this defense is not against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Accordingly, Perseus' first issue is overruled. The judgment of the trial court is airrned. SARAH B. DUNCAN, concurs in the judgth only. All Citations 995 S.W.2d 202 1 The Honorable Martha Tanner signed the judgment in this cause. The Honorable David A. Berchelman presided over the trial. 2 Martin was four months pregnant with the couple's child at the time of her death. Perseus, Inc. v. Canody, 995 S.W.2d 202 {1999] 3 It does not appear from the deposition excerpts introduced at trial that Fleichel was speaking of the specic night in question. In fact, from the testimony introduced at trial, it is not even clear that Fteichel was employed by the Hippodrome at the time of the fatal accident. 4 We decline the invitation of appellee Debbie Canody to hold that the safe harbor defense does not apply to a civil action brought undertex. Alco. Bev.Code Ann. .03 (Vernon 1995). By its plain terms, section 106.14 applies to any provision of the Code relating to the sales or service of alcoholic beverages to an intoxicated person. Additionally, this court has previously recognized the application of section 105.14 in a wrongful death case similar to the case at bar. Pena, 901 S.W.2d at 65?. 5 At trial Haass testied that she was mistaken in her deposition testimony, and that she left for New York in May 1994. 6 Carroll testified that she was the promotions director for the Hippodrome. She was unaware that her sister had ever made her the general manager, and she denied assuming any of the duties of general manager during her sister's absence. She specifically denied checking to assure that TABC regulations or guidelines were followed. 7 The policies include a summary of pertinent general liquor laws, which provides a somewhat detailed explanation of the prohibition against serving a minor. The summary is silent about the prohibition against serving intoxicated persons. Still another section on \"Laws and Policies" states that it is against the law to serve intoxicated persons and that such persons should not be allowed to stay on the premises. End of Document :0 2022 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works