B. Lee and Cody are playing a game in which Lee has the first move at A in the decision tree shown below. Once Lee has chosen either aggression or cooperation, Cody, who can see what Lee has chosen, must choose either aggression or cooperation at B or C. Both players know the payoffs at the end of each branch. Cody chooses Aggression -10 for Lee B -10 for Cody Aggression 40 for Lee Cooperation 0 for Cody Lee A chooses 0 for Lee Aggression Cooperation 40 for Cody C Cooperation 25 for Lee Cody 25 for Cody chooses i. Suppose Cody tells Lee that if Lee chooses aggression, then Cody will also choose aggression, and if Lee chooses cooperation, then Cody will also choose cooperation. Is Cody's threat credible? Explain. (4 points) 1i. What is the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of this game? Explain your answer. (6 points)