(b) Now suppose that there is asymmetric information regarding the value of Rafaela's pro- gramming skills. Because Rafaela has limited social skills and is somewhat reclusive, she does not have a good sense of how her skills compare to other programmers. Rafaela knows only that the probability her skills are \"extremely valuable\" is %, Whereas TiltSoft knows her skill level with certainty. Continue to assume Rafaela must make a take-it- or-leaveit salary offer to the rm. What salary o"er should she make, and under What conditions will Rafaela remain with TiltSoft? (Assume Rafaela is risk neutral and that her goal is to make the salary offer that will maximize he?" expected pay.) Hint: Your answer in part (a) should have been something like this: \"If Rafaela knows her skills are extremely valuable, she should offer X. If, on the other hand, she knows her skills are valuable, then she should o'er Y.\" Build a decision tree (as in the lecture video) using these two possible offers, and taking account of the fact that Tiltsoft will reject any salary offer that is above Rafaela's productivity