b. Suppose that Player 2 wishes to change the outcome of the game to one better for Player 2. Can Player 2 achieve this by making a promise to Player 1. provided the promise is credible? Given the outcomes, O no such promise is possible. O yes. He can promise Player I that if she chooses b, he will choose c. O yes. He can promise Player 1 that if she chooses b, he will choose d. O yes. He can promise Player I that if she chooses a, he will choose c. c. Can Player 2 achieve an outcome preferable to the equilibrium by issuing a threat to Player 1? Given the outcomes, O yes. He can threaten that if Player 1 chooses b. he will choose c. O no such threat is possible. O yes. He can threaten that if Player I chooses a, he will choose c. O yes. He can threaten that if Player I chooses a, he will choose d