Baby Bunting chooses to whether Open (0) a new store or Not (N) in Alexandria where one of its rival-Baby Kingdom's stores is located. If Baby Bunting opts for N, the payoff to Baby Bunting is 10 and Baby Kingdom gets 20. If Baby Bunting chooses to Open, Baby Kingdom then can choose to Fight (F) or Accommodate (A). If Baby Kingdom chooses F, following Baby Bunting's choice to Open, the payoff is (5, 5) to Baby Bunting and Baby Kingdom, respectively. If Baby Bunting chooses to Open, then Baby Kingdom opts forA payoffs are (15, 15). Which of the following statements are true? [3 (O, A) and (N, F) are two credible (subgame perfect) equilibria. C] (O, A) and (N, F) are two Nash equilibria C] (O, A) is a credible (subgame perfect) equilibrium C] (O, A) is a noncredible Nash equilibrium C] (N, F) is a noncredible Nash equilibrium