Beatty, Liao, and Weber (2012) investigated delegated montoring fo public debt issues. With delegated monitoring, debtholders allow monitoring of the debt by a specialist, like a bank. Hiring the specialist reduces the total cost of monitor when there are multiple issues of debt outstanding. A common feature in debt covenants when delegated monitoring may occur is a cross-acceleration covenant. These covenants work to make all classes of debt equal in the event of liquidation. However, the existance of these clauses also increases the likelihood of inappropriate liquidation. The likelihood of inappropriate liquidation is pronounced when the specialist (bank) may be a debt holder as well. In this case, the specialist will want to protect its own interest when the debt issuer approaches financial distress. The study found that cross-acceleration is less likely if the expected going-concern value of the borrowing fim exceeds that liquidation value of the firm. Why is the existance of the cross acceleration clause less likely in companies with this caracteristic?