1. Before the financial crisis, the B-piece investor in the typical CMBS would appoint the special servicer. What problems-due to the conflict of interest- would this give rise to?

(a)The special servicer would be too eager to push mortgages into foreclosure because that would ensure that the B-piece investor retained control rights over the deal

(b)The special servicer would modify delinquent mortgages in order to maximize the present value of recovery for the tranche holders

(c)The special servicer would modify delinquent mortgages in order to prevent control rights from shifting to the Operating Advisor working on behalf of the AAA investors

(d)The special servicer would modify delinquent mortgages in order to prevent the realization of losses to the B piece investor and to prevent control rights to shift to the next tranche from the bottom

(e)The special servicer would be incentivized to push for higher appraisal of foreclosed mortgages to maximize value for the B-piece investor