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Consider the following repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game. C D C 2, 2 -3, 8 D 8, -3 0, 0 1. Suppose this game is repeated for T periods, where T is finite. Find all the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria. For the following parts, suppose this game is repeated infinitely. Both players have discount factor 6 E [0, 1). 2. Suppose 6 = 0. Find all the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria. 3. Let both players adopt the following strategy: start with cooperation; cooperate as long as no one has ever defected before; otherwise defect. Find the minimum value of o such that this is a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria. 4. Suppose the payoff matrix for the original static game has been changed to: 2 Econ 101 Spring 2021 - UCLA C D C 2, 1 -1, 10 D 8, -3 0, 0 How does your answer to part 4 change? Is the new minimum value of o larger or smaller? Explain