BERG, DICKHAUT AND MCCABE (1995) $5.16 O Sent 301 $15.48 Surplus 25 20 $4.66 Returned 15 101 The stylized fact of non-trivial trust and trustworthiness is replicated to varying degrees in Barr (1999), Cox (1999), Fahr and Irlenbusch (1999) and Glaeser et al. (2000).In the Trust Game of Berg, Dickhaut and McGabe: O The game-theoretic prediction under selfish preferences involves Player 1 passing the whole pie in Stage 1 of the game. O Players 1 and 2 take turns in proposing a split of a given pie. O The total monetary payoffs for society are maximised if Player 1 passes all the money to Player 2. O The use of backward induction seems highly problematic