Brianna and Tatiana, fifth grade Girl Scouts, compete for customers outside the only grocery store in a 200-mile radius. Both girls have the same options, work hard or slack off. Because their product (delicious cookies) is nearly identical, the following revenue outcomes are possible: (i) each girl works hard and each makes $50.00, (il) each girl slacks off and each makes $25.00, or (iii) if one works hard and the other slacks off, the hard worker makes $75.00 and the girl who slacks off makes $5.00. Where these Girl Scouts differ, however, is how much it costs to get to the same grocery store each day. Brianna lives 50 miles away, and It costs her parents $95.00 in gas (round trip) to get her to the grocery store. Tatiana lives 125 miles away, and it costs her parents $285.00 in gas (round trip) to get to the grocery store. Assume that (i) these costs are taken out of each girl's revenue, (ii) they compete in a one-shot simultaneous game, (iii) both girls are so competitive that they definitely try to sell cookies only at the grocery store, and (iv) there are no other costs. Use the above information to generate the payoff (profit) values in the table below. In each cell, payoffs should be structured as (Brianna, Tatiana). Tatiana Works Hard Slacks Off Works Hard Brianna Slacks Off Part 2 (0.6 point) See Hint Identify the equilibrium in this game. Choose one: O A. Brianna slacks off, Tatiana works hard. O B. Brianna slacks off. Tatiana slacks off. O C. There is no pure strategy equilibrium. O D. Brianna works hard, Tatiana works hard. Q E. Brianna works hard. Tatiana slacks off. O F. There are multiple pure strategy equilibria