(c) [6 points] It turns out that firms earn zero profits when n = 9, so this is the equilibrium number of firms with free entry. Now, suppose the government then implements a tor, which results in the exit of 1 firm. Does this most likely cause total welfare to increase or decrease (relative to the original equilibrium)? Would your answer change if this were instead a differentiated products Cournot model? Explain.2. [12 points total] Consider a homogenous products Cournot market. The inverse demand function is given by p(@) = 100 - -Q. Firms in the market have cost function c(q:) = 10q; + 810. Recall the following useful notation: Q = qi +Qi (a) [2 points] Find Firm i's best response to the aggregate production of the other firms, q:(Q i).(b) [4 points] Suppose that there are n = 9 firms in the market. Find the Cournot equilibrium. Your answer should include individual firm production, q, aggregate production, Q, and the market price, p