Camp Lemonnier

General Instructions

Camp Lemonnier is a United States Naval Expeditionary Base located in the African country of Djibouti. Camp Lemonnier is home to the Combined Joint Task ForceHorn of Africa of the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM)and is the only permanent U.S. military base in Africa. While the base itself has a long history, operating initially as a French garrison, it became a U.S. military base in 2001 after the 9/11 attacks. At that time, the United States and Djibouti governments signed an agreement not only outlining the terms of the land leasing, but also signaling growing cooperation and partnership between the two countries. The United States was granted use of the land for the base, as well as rights to use the international airport, Djibouti-Ambouli International Airport (HDAM), located only six km from the base, and the Port of Djibouti.

Djibouti, officially the Republic of Djibouti, is a country located in the Horn of Africa in East Africa. It borders Somalia to the south, Ethiopia to the west, Eritrea to the north, and the Red Sea to the east. Across the Red Sea is the country of Yemen. Djibouti has a total area of 23,000 km, roughly the size of New Jersey in the United States. Djibouti's economy is primarily dependent on its port in the Red Sea and access to its shipping lanes.

Since 2001, Camp Lemonnier has been the headquarters for the United States' Operation Enduring Freedom, an initiative tasked with combating extremism and militant Islamism and piracy in the Horn of Africa. Camp Lemonnier is now the center of a network of coordinated drone and other military and aerial activities within Africa, as well as in the Persian Gulf.

Last year, tension arose between the two usually friendly nations after the crash of a U.S. unmanned aerial system (UAS) in the capital city of Djibouti. While no civilians were injured, the presence of U.S. troops and weaponry in the country became front-page news and citizens called on the Djibouti government to take action. As a result, the government has demanded increased transparency about the U.S. drone program operating from Camp Lemonnier. Additionally, the government is encouraging U.S. forces to use a smaller, non-commercial airstrip, Chabelley Airport (HDCH), instead of HDAM. HDCH is roughly 18 km away from Camp Lemonnier.

The contract for Camp Lemonnier was renegotiated in 2007, 2014, and will be renegotiated again this year by the United States Defense Attach and the Djiboutian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. Among other issues, the negotiation will include the standard lease terms (contract length, total lease payments per year, potential for renegotiation), as well as economic development aid, and support for the local population, including staffing.

Camp Lemonnier

Confidential Instructions for the Djiboutian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs

Background

You are the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Republic of Djibouti, tasked with representing Djibouti in negotiations with foreign governments. You have had an esteemed career within the Djiboutian government and have been proudly serving as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs for ten years. Your portfolio includes negotiations with neighboring nations on matters such as shipping channels, land borders, and migration, and a soon-to-be-constructed railway with Ethiopia, as well as negotiations with non-African nations. The majority of your negotiations with non-African nations consist of military land leases in Djibouti, specifically with the United States, Japan, France, and China. Recently, you have even received Russian interest in a land lease.

Due to the strategic importance of a continuing relationship with the United States of America, it is of course important to both continue good relations and successfully renegotiate this contract. However, the situation has changed somewhat in the past few years. The United States has created quite a bit of trouble for the Djibouti government recently; public outcry over the drone crash in the capital city most clearly comes to mind. Perhaps this was just the spark for an already smoldering public, but since that incident, Djiboutians have been more vocal in their displeasure of our government's tacit support for the increasingly notorious U.S. drone program. At the same time, interest has grown from other countries wanting to expand their own military presence in Djibouti. While other nations would not be able to bring the same security as a partnership with the United States does, they could certainly pay more for the land. It would be hard to calculate the loss if the Americans were to move their base elsewhere, as it would likely signal the end of a relationship that has been carefully cultivated for decades. However, it is essential that the concerns of the government and people of Djibouti are taken seriously, and remedies are found.

The following issues are listed in terms of importance, from most to least important:

• Airport
• Economic Development
• Staffing
• Lease Agreements
• Public Statement

Airport

Since the beginning of the relationship, the United States has used the Djibouti-Ambouli International Airport (HDAM). However, the feasibility of this arrangement has expired. As Camp Lemonnier has expanded, so too have the Americans' air-based missions, both manned and unmanned. It is increasingly frustratingand embarrassingfor news reports to come out showing a U.S. drone on a runway next to an international jet carrying tourists and businesspeople. It is even more frustrating when such a report is then closely followed by a reported drone strike in a nearby country. As the U.S. drone program has grown, it has brought increased scrutiny on us and made our government look weak. This is unacceptable. So far, we have offered the Chabelley Airport (HDCD) to the U.S. It's now time for them to move there. While HDCD is already a functioning airstrip, with an unpaved but usable runway and a tower for air-traffic control, the Americans would likely have to invest some resources to make it appropriately ready. Proposals from local companies have put the estimates in the range of $7- 10 million over the next two years.

Getting the U.S. to cease operations at HDAM and move to Chabelley is essential. A move to Chabelley would solve some of our public-relations issues, the U.S.' privacy issues, and will increase economic development in the region around Chabelley. The related infrastructure to support the airstrip would bring an estimated gain to Djibouti of approximately $3 million per year. We do not want the deal to fall apart over the airport, but do everything you can do get the U.S. to agree to move to Chabelley. If it is clear that this move is off the table, it will be essential to recover the economic development aid elsewhere, as well as secure an obvious public "win" in our relationship with the U.S.

Economic Development

The government of Djibouti will begin construction on a railway connecting Djibouti with neighboring Ethiopia later this year. The total cost of the project will be $600 million, with Djibouti's portion projected to cost roughly $250 million. The project will take six years to complete, in three distinct phases. The Chinese government has offered to provide economic development support for this project, but we would prefer U.S. support. For one, the U.S. is usually willing to use Djiboutian workers and companies. In exchange, the U.S. typically requires accountability checks and/or progress on the current government's other humanitarian pet issues. While historically, the U.S. has given Djibouti roughly $10 million for infrastructure projects, it is possible that the U.S. would be willing to support this project at a higher amount. It should be clear that if the U.S. refuses to move to Chabelley, then their commitment here should be significant.

Staffing

Camp Lemonnier currently staffs 800 Djiboutians, making it the largest single employer, other than the government of Djibouti, in the country. Historically, this has been a strength of the partnership and a display of mutual benefit. However, this past year, we narrowly avoided a very public embarrassment when the U.S. fired all air-traffic controllers and replaced them with American officers after, in their telling, a string of "close calls." Ironic, consider their own "close call" this year that ended with a drone crashing in our capital city. We were able to resolve the problem quietly by asking the U.S. to hire the same workers in new jobs, but it exposed a flaw in our system. We cannot rely solely on the goodwill of the U.S. when it comes to the livelihoods of so many Djiboutians and must codify this relationship with a quota. Currently 800 Djiboutians and 3,500 Americans are employed by Camp Lemonnier. We must either codify a quota of roughly 18% or a ratio of 1:5 in the future. This is important given the existing relationship but will become especially important if the size of Camp Lemonnier increases.

Lease Agreements

The original 2001 contract was for a 75-acre plot of land with the Americans paying $20 million per year in rent. At the time, this was the only such lease agreement of its kind between Djibouti and another country. The 2007, negotiations expanded Camp Lemonnier from the original 75 acres to 250 acres, and increased the rent to $35 million per year. In 2007, Djibouti also began leasing land to China, with roughly comparable terms. In 2014, Camp Lemonnier expanded from 250 acres to just over 500 acres, and lease payments increased to $48 million per year. Around the same time, China increased the size of its land to roughly 500 acres, paying approximately $55 million per year.

Year (Party) Land Payment (Millions USD per year)

2001 (US) 75 20

2007 (US) 250 35

2007 (China) 250 (approx) 35 (approx)

2014 (US) 500 48

2014 (China) 500 55

While the U.S. has not directly expressed their desire to lease additional land, a leaked report indicates that the U.S. Pentagon is preparing to ask the U.S. Congress for over $1 billion in funds for Camp Lemonnier expansions. As such, be prepared to discuss leasing additional land to the United States. There are approximately 350 acres to the southwest of the base that are available. However, due to location of these 350 acres, if the U.S. were to expand beyond 150 acres, that would dissuade China from increasing the size of its lease in the future. As such, leasing up to 150 more acres to the Americans would be relatively "cost-free" for the Djiboutian government, but any lease expansion between 151 and 350 acres should be on very favorable terms for our government because it would be giving up a more lucrative expansion deal with China.

Considering the other terms of the deal, we could lease up to 650 (existing 500 acres + 150 additional) total acres to the U.S. for $55 million per year, matching the lease payments of the Chinese government. Anything additional, however, should cover as much of the lost potential revenue from the Chinese as possible. While we are not certain what the exact cost of this potential revenue would be, we have prepared an estimate of up to $38.5 million (the current Chinese price is $0.11 million per acre x 350 acres). It is not an exact comparison, however, because we would rather lease the land to the U.S. than to the Chinese, given other considerations (continuing partnership, economic development, etc.).

If the U.S. is indeed looking to expand the base, we would also like an agreement that, wherever possible, they will employ Djiboutian companies and workers.

Public Statements

As is precedent, we would like a joint statement between the two governments at the successful end of the negotiation highlighting our continued long-term partnership. However, instead of the typical coordinated statements between high-ranking officials, we would like the President of Djibouti and President of the United States to make their statement together during our President's visit to the United States next month.

Additionally, we would like use this statement to promote the economic development projectas a symbol not only of a strong partnership, but also of regional cooperation and support from the United States.

We have heard disconcerting news that the U.S. President would like our President to declare war on the use of khat in our country. As you know, chewing khat is a practice dating back thousands of years in the Horn of Africa, often resulting in a high compared to drinking strong coffee. Even the suggestion of bringing khat into this negotiation is an insult to us. American paternalism is something we have carefully managed in the past and it will be up to you to do so in the upcoming negotiation, as well. We especially cannot set up our President to walk into a situation where such a thing would be asked of him.

The Agreement

If the terms of the negotiation are satisfactory, it would be wise to negotiate a ten-year agreement with no possibility to renew. Removing the possibility to renew gives us the flexibility to renegotiate the terms in the future, as things change over time. A possibility to renew should only be included if the terms are extremely favorable. This would lock in a yearly lease price and minimize the need to have drawn-out negotiations again soon.

Due to the extremely high importance of these negotiations, the Minister of Foreign Affairs sent the following memo outlining their expectations for the upcoming negotiation.

CLASSIFIED

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF DJIBOUTI

Djiboutian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Minister of Foreign Affairs Upcoming Negotiations re: Camp Lemonnier

Find a summary of what we expect you to accomplish on each of the issues on the table for negotiations with the Americans below. The issues are listed in order of relative priority from essential (airport) to important (public statement). Do not interpret this to mean some issues are not important.

We could quite easily lease the land to other countries should the deal not be renegotiated with the Americans. Of course, the benefits, however non-quantifiable, we receive from a strong partnership with the United States cannot be overstated. Should the contract not be renegotiated, we do not believe the United States has bases that could easily replace Camp Lemonnier's strategic importance.

As you know, I speak on behalf of the President when I say a favorable deal is of utmost importance to us all. Do us, and your country, proud.

Airport

• Move U.S. to Chabelley Airport (HDCD), discontinue use of Djibouti International-Ambouli Airport (HDAM)
• U.S. pays for any required development of HDCD

Economic Development

Significant support for large-scale railway project (total project cost: $250 million)

Staffing

• Institute quota: roughly 18% of workers, or 1 Djiboutian for every 5 Americans
• Commit to hire Djiboutian workers and companies wherever possible (for relevant construction and expansion of base)

Lease Agreements

• Up to 650 acres, $55 million per year
• 650 - 850 acres, $55 million per year + up to $38.5 million (minimize potential loss in revenue)
• Ten-year agreement, no possibility to renew

Public Statement

Public statement between both governments o Mention: Long-term partnership, Economic development aid o Do not mention: khat

Can you help me negotiate all the parameters of this prompt?