Can I get answers to all the questions? specially d

Q3 Consider the following three-player normal form game [Player 3 is the page player): Player 3 A B Player 2 Player 2 A B A B Player 1 A 3,2,1 1,2,3 Playerl A 1,2,3 2,1,3 B 1,3,2 3,1,2 B 2,31 3,2,1 u For each player, strategies are A and B. a) Find the pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the above game. Assume now that the above game is played sequentially, with Player 3 moving rst, Player 1 moving second, and Player 2 moving third. b) Write down the game tree. c) For each player, list all the available pure strategies. (1) Find the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome and compare it with the equilibrium outcome you found in subquestion a). Comment