can someone solve this with steps?

Problem 1 Two countries called Carbon Lovers and the Really Crude are deciding their oil production levels for the year. Carbon Lovers and Really Crude are currently at war and are funding their war efforts through oil revenue. Let q: denote the barrels of oil that Carbon Lovers produces and q; denote the barrels of oil that Really Crude produces. It costs $10 to produce each barrel of oil. World demand for oil is given by the demand function GU\") = 200 2P, where P is the price per barrel of oil. Part A (1) 'Which model that we have studied best represents the situation described in this problem. (ii) How many barrels of oil will each country produce to maximize prot? How much prot will each rm earn? (iii) Suppose Carbon Lovers and Really Crude sign a peace treaty and agree to cooperate. Each will produce the same number of barrels. How many barrels of oil would each sell to maximize their joint prot? How much prot does each earn? (iv) Really Crude is plotting to renege on its treaty with Carbon Lovers. Carbon Lovers is completely unaware of Really ICrude's plot to renege and will continue producing at the peace treaty level. Hov.r many barrels of oil should Really Crude produce to maximize prot? How much prot will Carbon Lovers and Really Crude earn? (v) In the absence of a peace treaty, what is (are) the Nash equilibrium (equilibria) in the production- setting game between Carbon Lovers and Really Crude? Part B Suppose that the countries agree to a tenuous cease re. Each country will produce at the peace treaty level, provided that the other country does as well. Deviations from the peace treaty level will be punished by playing the single period Nash equilibrium in every period thereafter. Denote d as the discount rate. (1) 'What is term for the strategy that the countries are playing? (ii) Write the normal-form representation of the single-period game between the countries [Hint: the payoifs are the prot values from Part A]. (iii) For what values of d is the strategy described in the problem a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium