Can you explain this table in simple terms? This is from The role of institutional investors in voting: evidence from the securities lending market case study and I need to understand this chart. Please explain clearly.

Descriptive Statistics: Voting Proposals This table presents descriptive statistics for 56,220 proxy proposals of Russell 3000 firms over the 20072009 period. Panel A shows data for all proposals while Panel B shows voting outcome statistics for different types of nonroutine proposals. VOTES CAST is the percentage of the total votes cast relative to shares outstanding. FOR, AGAINST, and ABSTAIN are the total number of votes for, against, and abstained, respectively, relative to the BASE, against which the proposal outcome is measured (expressed as a percentage). VOTE MARGIN is defined as FOR minus the minimum threshold required for the proposal to pass. Voting outcome variables are winsorized at the 1% level. In Panel B, Obs. refers to the number of proposal observations and RDATE Obs. refers to the number of record date proposals (there may be multiple proposals on each record date). NONROUTINE proposals are proposals not relating to operational or uncontested directorships. MGT are management-sponsored proposals, and SHDR are shareholder-sponsored proposals. G- INDEX, COMP, and CORP CONTROL are dummies for, respectively, antitakeover, compensation, and merger/proxy contest-related proposals. Panel A: Voting Outcome for All Proposals Obs. Mean Median Std Dev Min Max VOTES CAST 56,220 86.62% 88.74% 9.49% 37.42% 100% FOR 56,220 91.86% 97.37% 14.15% 18.94% 100% AGAINST 56,220 7.54% 2.48% 13.25% 0.00% 75% ABSTAIN 56,220 0.41% 0.00% 1.56% 0.00% 11.9% VOTE MARGIN 56,220 70.16% 87.10% 30.79% -31.37% 100% Panel B: Voting Outcome by Proposal Type for Nonroutine Proposals RDATE VOTES VOTE Obs. Obs. CAST FOR AGAINST ABSTAIN MARGIN NONROUTINE 6,887 3,719 77.65% 73.24% 23.02% 1.86% 23.43% MGT 5,127 3,717 78.82% 84.61% 11.73% 0.97% 35.01% SHDR 1,760 824 74.27% 39.99% 55.91% 4.44% -10.50% COMP 4,024 2,854 77.76% 80.67% 18.02% 1.34% 30.48% G-INDEX 1,190 1,034 79.54% 65.23% 28.19% 1.10% 9.96% CORP CONTROL 588 371 72.31% 80.60% 14.64% 3.53% 51.35% specifically to antitakeover provisions (G-INDEX) included in the G-INDEX developed by Gompers, Ishi, and Metrick (2003), compensation proposals (COMP), and proposals related to mergers/proxy contests (CORP CONTROL). In Panel B of Table II we summarize the voting outcome of nonroutine proposals, which comprise 12.25% of the full sample. These proposals have almost three times more votes cast against the proposal than we find for the full sample. Almost 60% of nonroutine proposals are related to compensation. Shareholder-sponsored proposals represent a much smaller subset of nonrou- tine proposals (only 25.56%) with 40% of votes being in favor, although when ISS is in favor of the proposal the average proportion of FOR votes increases to 46.17%. Examples of shareholder-sponsored proposals include say on pay and requests that the firm provide cumulative voting, reduce supermajority voting, require an independent chairman of board, require a majority vote for 2320 The Journal of Finance the election of directors, and declassify the board of directors. We also provide descriptive statistics on nonroutine proposals likely to attract more attention from investors. Proposals related to compensation, antitakeover, and corporate control receive far more votes against than the average across all proposals. Descriptive Statistics: Voting Proposals This table presents descriptive statistics for 56,220 proxy proposals of Russell 3000 firms over the 20072009 period. Panel A shows data for all proposals while Panel B shows voting outcome statistics for different types of nonroutine proposals. VOTES CAST is the percentage of the total votes cast relative to shares outstanding. FOR, AGAINST, and ABSTAIN are the total number of votes for, against, and abstained, respectively, relative to the BASE, against which the proposal outcome is measured (expressed as a percentage). VOTE MARGIN is defined as FOR minus the minimum threshold required for the proposal to pass. Voting outcome variables are winsorized at the 1% level. In Panel B, Obs. refers to the number of proposal observations and RDATE Obs. refers to the number of record date proposals (there may be multiple proposals on each record date). NONROUTINE proposals are proposals not relating to operational or uncontested directorships. MGT are management-sponsored proposals, and SHDR are shareholder-sponsored proposals. G- INDEX, COMP, and CORP CONTROL are dummies for, respectively, antitakeover, compensation, and merger/proxy contest-related proposals. Panel A: Voting Outcome for All Proposals Obs. Mean Median Std Dev Min Max VOTES CAST 56,220 86.62% 88.74% 9.49% 37.42% 100% FOR 56,220 91.86% 97.37% 14.15% 18.94% 100% AGAINST 56,220 7.54% 2.48% 13.25% 0.00% 75% ABSTAIN 56,220 0.41% 0.00% 1.56% 0.00% 11.9% VOTE MARGIN 56,220 70.16% 87.10% 30.79% -31.37% 100% Panel B: Voting Outcome by Proposal Type for Nonroutine Proposals RDATE VOTES VOTE Obs. Obs. CAST FOR AGAINST ABSTAIN MARGIN NONROUTINE 6,887 3,719 77.65% 73.24% 23.02% 1.86% 23.43% MGT 5,127 3,717 78.82% 84.61% 11.73% 0.97% 35.01% SHDR 1,760 824 74.27% 39.99% 55.91% 4.44% -10.50% COMP 4,024 2,854 77.76% 80.67% 18.02% 1.34% 30.48% G-INDEX 1,190 1,034 79.54% 65.23% 28.19% 1.10% 9.96% CORP CONTROL 588 371 72.31% 80.60% 14.64% 3.53% 51.35% specifically to antitakeover provisions (G-INDEX) included in the G-INDEX developed by Gompers, Ishi, and Metrick (2003), compensation proposals (COMP), and proposals related to mergers/proxy contests (CORP CONTROL). In Panel B of Table II we summarize the voting outcome of nonroutine proposals, which comprise 12.25% of the full sample. These proposals have almost three times more votes cast against the proposal than we find for the full sample. Almost 60% of nonroutine proposals are related to compensation. Shareholder-sponsored proposals represent a much smaller subset of nonrou- tine proposals (only 25.56%) with 40% of votes being in favor, although when ISS is in favor of the proposal the average proportion of FOR votes increases to 46.17%. Examples of shareholder-sponsored proposals include say on pay and requests that the firm provide cumulative voting, reduce supermajority voting, require an independent chairman of board, require a majority vote for 2320 The Journal of Finance the election of directors, and declassify the board of directors. We also provide descriptive statistics on nonroutine proposals likely to attract more attention from investors. Proposals related to compensation, antitakeover, and corporate control receive far more votes against than the average across all proposals