Can you please answer question 1.2 and 1.3?

1 A society is composed of 3 individuals: Lila. There exists =1 alternatives: A. B. (3.13. Individual preferences are given l)}-' sdkiB>-C>"jD BFjD>-jC>-JA AskBstCskD. For each of the methods below. find the resulting social ranking. 1.1 Start with the entire set of alternatives and count how many voters prefer each alternative the most. If one alternative is preferred the most by more individuals than any other alternative, then place this alternative at the top of the social ranking. Now consider only the set of remaining alternatives and repeat the process to nd the second best alternative in the social ranking. Continue until all alternatives are ranked. 1.2 First, each individual eliminates the alternative he or she prefers the least. If more than one alternative is eliminated, place last the one eliminated by more individuals. Repeat until you have ranked all alterna- tives. You might have noticed that both systems violate Universal Domain. 1.3 With an example with three individuals, i.j._k, and three alternatives, A,B.C, show that the system in 1.2 violates Universal Domain. Definition (Universal Domain] A social welfare function satisfies universal domain if every possible preference list input re5ult5 in a well-defined (cemplete and transitive} social ranking output. I Complete: For any two alternatives (AB) either A >3 B or B >' A l Transitive: For any three alternative (ABL) if A >* B and B>* CthenA>-* C