Can you please answer question 2.1 and 2.3, with in depth explanations of how you arrived at the answer?

2 Pareto efficiency and social surplus There are two citizens: A and B. An alternative is defined by x = (xA, xB). Individual preferences are represented by uf(x) = x4, u (x) = B. There are only 3 feasible alternatives: 21 = (0,0), 12 = (2,2), and T3 = (1, 10). 2.1 Which alternatives are Pareto efficient? 2.2 Which alternatives maximize social surplus? Now suppose that A is altruistic and has preferences represented by u (x) = x4+ 1 TB 2 2.3 Which alternatives are Pareto efficient? Pareto Efficiency Definition: An allocation is pareto efficient if it is impossible to make one person better without making another person worse In a simple example with two individuals, an allocation (or alternative) A is Pareto efficient if there is no B such that U1 (B ) > U1 ( A ) U2 ( B ) 2 U2 ( A ) and at least one inequality is strict (>)