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Finks v. Maine State Highway Commission

32 A.2d 791 (1974)

Dufresne, Chief Justice.

The defendant, Maine State Highway Commission on or about April 8, 1969 recorded a Notice of Layout and Taking for the purpose of acquiring the state of Maine easement rights in lands of the plaintiffs in Falmouth, Maine as part of a comprehensive plan to "preserve and develop the natural scenic beauty along and adjacent to any state highway for aesthetics" as authorized by 23 MRS Sec. 651.By complaint dated May 27, 1969, the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief against the taking on the grounds that the enabling legislation was unconstitutional on its face, or if constitutional, did not sanction the condemnation of any part of the plaintiffs' land, nor did it permit a taking of such magnitude in this case.

The statute, authorizing the taking of the plaintiff's land by eminent domain, under which the Commission purported to act, is entitled an Act Relating to Roadside Beautification in 1965 as follows:

23 MRS S. 153

The State Highway Commission, on behalf of the State of Maine, may take over and hold for the State of Maine, such property as it may deem necessary to:

"2. Roadside development.Provide rest areas, parking strips, roadside and landscape development for the preservation and development of natural scenic beauty."

23 MRS S. 651

"The commission may preserve and develop the natural scenic beauty along and adjacent to any state aid highway to integrate the public improvement with the aesthetics of the area traversed by the highway and may establish and maintain such areas whenever in its judgment the public exigency may require.

I.PRESERVATION AND DEVLOPMENT OF SCENIC BEAUTY ALONG HIGHWAYS - PUBLIC USE

[1] It is fundamental law that the exercise of the State's power of eminent domain, to come up to constitutional requirements, must be for a public use and upon public exigency.The Maine and US Constitutions state that "private property shall not be taken for public uses without just compensation; nor unless the publics exigencies require it."And, "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law..."

Thus, as a threshold issue, we must decide whether the taking of land beyond the right of way of a state highway for the purpose of preserving and developing the natural scenic beauty along, and adjacent to, the highway is a valid public use justifying the State's exercise of the power of imminent domain.If such is a public use, then the Act is Constitutional on its face.

[2] In Wes Outdoor Advertising Company v. Goldberd, 1970, the New Jersey Court had this to say:

"We have no hesitancy in stating the restoration, preservation, and enhancement of scenic beauty adjacent to public highway is a public use for the public welfare, filling a social need of our times."

We fully agree.

II.LEGISLATIVE DETERMINATION OF PUBLIC EXIGENCY

The plaintiffs contend that the reference statute is unconstitutional on its face because nowhere in the Act, does the legislature specifically declare that there is a necessity in the public interest for the provision respecting highway beautification.But a legislative finding of public exigency may be established implicitly by the very enactment of the statue authorizing the takings.See, State v. Noyes 17 Me. 340.

It is true that section 651 does not speak in specific terms of taking for the purpose of preserving and developing the natural scenic beauty along and adjacent to nay state highway, but as stated in Robin v. W. H. Hisman, Inc. 1969 Me. 253 A.2d 70, both sections 153 and 651 must be read in conjunction with each other.

[3] Every statute must be construed in connection with the whole system of which it forms a part and all legislation on the same subject matter must be viewed in its overall entirety to reach harmonious results which we presume the Legislature intended.Palmer v. Inhabitants of Town of Sumner, 133 Me. 337.

[4]Applying this rule of construction to these pertinent sections of the statute relating to the exercise of the Commission of the power of eminent domain in connection with the layingout and improvement of state highways, we readily discern that the preservation and development of the natural scenic beauty aspect of both sections 153 and 651 was so intimately related to the Commission's right to take and hold property for the purposes enumerated as to evince an implicit finding by the Legislature of a public exigency.

III. LEGISLATIVE STANDARDS

[5] The plaintiffs further press their claim that the statute, in its scenic beautification feature, is facially unconstitutional for failure to provide adequate standards to guide the Commission in its exercise of the delegated power of eminent domain.While we have recently expressed concern about standard-less delegations of power by legislative bodies, we do recognize that, in some areas of legitimate and necessary legislative undertakings, it may not be feasible to supply precise standards to guide the discretion of the agency to whom the powers to take by eminent domain have been delated, without frustrating the purposes of the particular legislation.We are of the opinion that, in such cases in which the statutory enactment of detailed specific standards is impossible, the presence of adequate procedural safeguards to protect against an abuse of discretion by the administrators of the law, compensates substantially for the want of precise legislative guidelines and may be taken into consideration in resolving the constitutionality of the delegation of power.

Specifically, the plaintiffs contend that the statutory terminology "scenic beauty" and "along and adjacent" to a state highway provides an inadequate set of standards to control the discretion of the highway commissioners.

[6] With regard to the statute's grant of power to the commissioners to acquire land along and adjacent to the highway "to preserve scenic beauty" it would seem, and we so hold, that the conceptnatural scenic beautyalthough more generally used in a subjective sense, connotes, in terms of highway beautification, a sufficiently definite concrete image when tested objectively so as to furnish in and of itself an adequate standard for the measurement of a proper exercise of discretion in a taking for such purposes.

The legislature would be hard pressed to define in specifics the broad connotation which the expression "natural scenic beauty" conveys, and we thoroughly agree with the New Jersey Supreme court making the following observations:

"The Act contemplates that there is a certain basic beauty in natural terrain not spoiled by the hand of man, which it proposes to recapture or maintain.Although the extent to which each individual finds a specific landscape beautiful must be determined by a subjective test, this does not denote that there is no criterion for the precise panorama.It is concerned with such possible situations that it does not lend itself to a more specifically detailed descriptive statement."Wes Outdoor Advertising Company v. Goldberg, supra.

The plaintiffs further contend that the statute is unconstitutional on its face for its failure to provide a more specific spatial standard for subscribing a taking than the gauge of being "along and adjacent" to the highway might seem to present a more difficult problem.However, the Legislature's choice of the less definite "along and adjacent" to the highway standards reflects a reluctance to impose an absolute limitation on the discretion of the commissioners which might in the unusual case prevent the fulfillment of the objectives of the Act.

[7] At the time the Legislature enacted the statute it was well settled judicially that it could delegate without specific spatial constrictions the determination of the extent to which property may be taken in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, subject, however, to judicial review, if the determination of the necessity of the taking is made in bad faith or through as abuse of power. Hayford v. City of Bangor, 66 A. 731.

As stated in Brown v.Kennebec Water District, "there is no constitutional right on the part of the landowner to have the question of the necessity of the takingsubmitted to a court; and in the statutory authority for a determination or revision of the matter by the court, the decision of the Legislature or its chosen agents in conclusive."

[8,9] Thus, our problem lies in the interpretation of the language of the reference statute as a whole.Whether the literal meaning of the words of an Act will control as against a broader or more narrow interpretation of their possible intendent depends upon the policy the Legislature is seeking to implement and the goals it intends to reach through such legislation.See Emple Kniting Mills v. City of Bangor 153 A.2d 1.

[10,11] The statutory history of legislation upon a particular subject matter may be taken into consideration in ascertaining legislative intent.It is relevant in throwing light on its meaning.The whole body of previous and contemporaneous legislation upon a particular topic should be considered in interpreting any statues.Cram v. Inhabitants of Cumberland County 96 A.2d 839.

[12] The Legislature is presumed to have in mind previous decisions of this Court when enacting statutes.We must, therefore, assume that in the passage of the Statute relating to the exercise of the powers of eminent domain for highway purposes, the Legislature enacted such legislation in the light of previous judicial interpretative decisions.Blier v. Inhabitants of Town of Fort Kent 273 A2.d 732.

[13] Therefore,we must conclude that the Legislature granted the State Highway Commission "an unrestricted agency to take by eminent domain which includes the determination of the suitability of the property for the particular public use and the extent to which the property must be taken to satisfy the exigency" subject to the limitations inherent in the conceptual phrase "along and adjacent to any state highway" and subject to judicial review for any abuse of power. (In re Bangor Hydro Company supra at 803)

[14] "To abuse power is to use it in an extravagant manner, to employ it contrary to the law or use it improperly and to excess"Swenson v. Cahoon 111 Fla.788.

Before it may be said that the Commission abused its delegated power in taking land areas to preserve and develop natural scenic beauty along our highways, there must be a determination of the legislative meaning which the Legislature meant to ascribe to the expression "along and adjacent" to any state highway.

[15] Absent a legislative definition, the term "along and adjacent" must be given a meaning consistent with the overall statutory context.The word "along" is defined by Webster dictionary to mean "by the length of," implying at or near, the side of;while the word "adjacent" is said to signify "close" or "bordering on."

Both words represent relative concepts and leave no arbitrary meaning or definition and their interpretation in any particular case must be determined in the light of the object sought to be accomplished by the statutory provisions in which they are used.

The plaintiffs contend for a narrow and strict interpretation against the omission as the donee of the power of eminent domain in degradation of private right and cite Clark v. Coburn in support thereof.But, as stated in Whiting v. Lubec 1211Me 121:

"There is nothing hallowed about the rule of strict construction; there should be nothing wrongful.Nor is it truly mechanical.It is a very practical rule.Being a good rule, it will work both ways.When it would be destructive of legislative intent, then the reason for using it ceases.Reasoning and judgment, not the mere said literalness of statutory phrasing, must guide and control research for a judicious legislative design."

[16] The true legislative purpose which the Legislature sought to accomplish by the highway beautification aspect of the eminent domain statutory provisions relating to the establishment or improvement of state highways was, as specifically expressed, to integrate the public improvement with the aesthetics of the area traversed by the highway.It is apparent that our Legislators in their effort at beautifying our highway land scaping plan, recognized that it would be necessary, if the naturel scenic beauty along our highways were to be maintained and developed, for the Commission to have the power to take lands on both sides of the highway, lands that were immediately in contact with the highway as well as lands that might not be contiguous, but so near as to be part of the panoramic area.So long as the taking whether of a single parcel of land or of multiple parcels, results in one comprehensive area which is both contiguous to and near the highway, the end legislative result is reached.The only limitation is that the exercise of the power be not abused, as by reasons of an unreasonable excessive taking or for arbitrary purposes inconsistent with the intent of the law.

As so construed, we cannot say that the provisions of 23 MRS 153 and 651 are unconstitutional on their face. Again, we agree with the New Jersey Court, when it said:

"Although the statute does not in finite terms impose a specific limit upon the amount of land which may be acquired, the express purpose of acquisition does delineate a sufficient guide for a reasonable exercise of the power of condemnation.The very purpose of the act require a consider degree of discretion."Wes Outdoor Advertising Company v. Goldberg, supra, at page 202.

IV.INSTANT TAKING AN ABUSE OF POWER

The Plaintiffs have argued that the taking in this case, exceeding as it does 1,400 feet from the highway right of way, is beyond the intended scope of section 651.

As noted previously, it is clear that, in choosing the indefinite "along and adjacent" standards, the Legislature deliberately eschewed imposing a rigid limitation on the Highway Commission, withview towards allowing the Commissioners maximum flexibility to accomplish the objectives of the statute.On the other hand, the Legislature's selection of the "along and adjacent to the highway" concepts indubitably indicates an attempt to place some spatial limitational control on the power of the Commission to take land for highway beautifications. Otherwise, the "long and adjacent" language would be insignificant make-weight, leaving only the "scenic beauty" standard to limit the power of the Commissioners.

[17] In the construction of a statute, nothing should be treated as surplusage, if a reasonable interpretation supplying meaning and force is possible.National Newark & Essex Bank v. Hart 1973, 309 A2.d 512.

The problem then lies in the interpretation, on a case-by-case basis, of the legislatively imposed limitation upon the taking of land, in this case concededly a natural scenic beauty area, whether the taking goes beyond the legislative mandate requiring the property taken to be along and adjacent of the highway.

Other states have enacted statutes to beautify highway roadsides in response to the national effort to beautify America, most of which limited takings for such purposes to stated maximum distances from the highway right of way.The State of Idahoallows its highway commission to take up to 1,000 feet of land for such purposes.New York requires that any property for roadside beautification lying more than 660 feed be acquired only by gift or purchase. The taking in this case, which extends almost 1,450 feet from the edge of the right of way, is thus nearly 50% greater than the maximum limit of any state which has fixed an absolute standard in such condemnations.In considering these varied limitations placed upon the right to take property by eminent domain for highway beautification purposes, we do not wish to imply that these maximum limits adopted by our sister states had a direct bearing upon the meaning of the "along and adjacent" standard with the Maine Legislature.However, they do represent the mature judgment of governmental bodies in their determination of the extent to which a taking of land for scenic vistas along highway would be reasonable.We must presume that our Legislators had somewhat similar objectives in their adoption of the flexible standard of "along and adjacent to the highway."

We can envision circumstances in which a taking of over 1,000 feet of land might be justified.Such might be the case if the shore of a lake or a river might be somewhat beyond 1,000 feet from the highway.To take less than the full distance to the lake might leave a small area, which, if not taken could frustrate the very purpose of the Act.

[18, 19] The taking in the instant case in excess of 1,000 feet from the highway was unreasonable and an abuse of power.The record negates the existence of an unusual, picturesque landscape on the fringes of the 1,000 feet scenic highway board strip which, if not taken, would defeat the ends of this legislation.The land beyond 1,000 feet is made up of marshland and tidal flats and is indistinguishable from the entire surrounding area.It presents no likelihood of future development that would impede the scenic value of the view from the highway.There is no natural boundary within immediate reach, such as a river, to permit a reasonable extension of the taking and yet keep it within the scope of a sensible application of the concept of land along and adjacent to the highway.

We, therefore, conclude that the taking in the instant case as excessive and beyond the intent of the statute. We believe that the Legislature used the "along and adjacent" language to curb in a meaningful way the discretion of the Highway Commission. In a taking exceeding 1,000 feet, it must appear there existed compelling reasons to take the marginal excess to preserve the primary beauty scene.

The entry will be:

The taking of the Plaintiffs' land by the Maine State Highway Commission in the instant case for highway beautification is hereby declared excessive and beyond the scope of 23 MRS 153 and 651, and thus null and void.