Can you please help me with this question from the images of the AIMS case below?

1. What are your overall recommendations to top management based on the customer profitability information?

American Investment Management Services (AIMS) Kim Davis, Executive Vice President ofAlMS, satin her 43\" car corner oice overlooking the Manhattan skyline, reecting on the challenges facing the investment services business in 2000. Profits had come easily during the longest economic expansion of the century. However, signs of weakness in the economy, nancial market volatility, intense competition for high net worth customers, and the proliferation of complex technology-dependent products were all making her me much more complicated. AlMS had recently invested in new analytic tools to help think more strategicolb' about its operations and customers. Kim wondered how much the new analytic approach would really impact business decision-matting. Was intensive customer segment analysis a real opportunity or just another "shot in the dark? \" AIMS is one of the larger investment services providers in the U.S., approaching $500 billion in assets in 2000. Of this total, a little more than half was in mutual limds and the balance in brokerage accounts. This case deals with customer protability assessment for AIMS' 3.9 million households, up from 1.8 million in just four years. Until 1999, AIMS had no system for measuring the protability of any specic customer. SEGMENTATION AIMS spanned two separate and very different product lines (mutual snds and fullline brokerage services), but that was only one element of the complexity it faced. In addition to this product complexity, it also spanned three distinct \"distribution channels\" (Call Centers, Full Service Branches, and E-business), and a complex array of customers with diverse asset holdings, trading patterns, investment objectives and service requirements. There was no particularly sharp focus on what kind of households to add. The basic idea was high wealth, but that was not pushed exclusively at all. Basically, AIMS wanted to do business with the same 2 million American households (over $1 million in invested assets) that 2] other major nancial services rms were pursuing. In 1999, AIMS introduced segment analysis, starting with a four-way segmentation that mixed three different dimensions: asset holdings, trading activity and age (as a proxy for investment objectives). The rst segment was any household with more than $500,000 in assets under management at AIMS (\"High Net Worth,\" or \"HNW'U. Failing this test, the second segment was households trading more than 36 times in 1993 (\"Active Traders,\" or \"AT\"). Failing this test as well, the third segment was households where the principal customer was already retirement age (60 years old). Finally, customers failing all three of these tests comprised the fourth segmentall other, termed \"Core\" customers. \"Core,\" with more than l0% of all households, was the largest segment. The primary role of any segmentation is to facilitate analysis leading to management actions tailored to the specic needs of dened customer subgroups. No particular segmentation is ever beyond dispute. Whatever approach is chosen necessarily emphasizes some distinctions and de- emphasizes others. But, the AIMS segmentation was particularly contentious on two grounds: 1) it segmented current customers rather than a market. It is as if Procter dc Gamble were to segment the detergent market based on how many pounds of Tide are purchased; 2) the sequence specic classication scheme meant that labels could be misleading: for example, the segment Active Trader applies only to households which are not each HNW. And, \"Retiree" applied only to households which were not each l-INW or AT. AIMS High Net Worth (2 $500,000 of assets under management) At a casual level of analysis, an unprofitable 1. (16,000 Households) > $2,000,000 in assets under household suggests one of two responses: management "Fire" them, because AIMS does not want 2. (141,000 Households) - $500,000 to $2,000,000 customers on whom it loses money. . "Do nothing," because there is usually some Active Traders (2 36 trades per year) compensating business reason for keeping 3. (9,000 Households) - more than 200 trades them-the "loss leader" concept. It is possible 4. (12,000 Households) - 60 to 200 trades to construct a long list of reasons to choose to 5. (19,000 Households) - 36 to 60 trades keep any one currently unprofitable household. At a deeper level of analysis, an unprofitable household Retirees suggests that AIMS change its behavior (or the 6. (262,000 Households) - $100,000 to $500,000 in household's behavior) to convert the household to assets under management profitable status. In general, there are three ways to 7. (607,000 Households) 200 Trades 14.5 -1.2 11% 60-200 9.4 -2.0 23% 36-60 7.4 -3.2 36% Retirees 100-500K 45.4 -7.8 9%