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A. Large number n of investors make ajoint investment {of 1 unit each} which yields a return 1' :2 1 [per unit invested) if it matures. For the project to mature requires that at least L, 1 d: L { n, investors do not withdraw their money early. Yet, each investor may experience an interim liquidity shock which forces her to withdraw. More formally1 an investor may he one of ten types. Type 1 of investor i occurs with a small probability 1?, making is payoff function unis} = 1 sh where sz- E {f}, 1}. With probability '1 E, investor i is of type '2 and has payoff function we- if 2:213sz 13.- if Eggs-{L Each investor learns her own type, but not the type of other investors1 and deches whether to withdraw {51- = D} or not {3i = 1] conditional on her type. Assume that {a} Write, down a \"rough" extensive form ofthis game. assuming :1 =2 and L =1. {b} Find a {Bayesian} Nash equilibrium of this game. [For the general case.)