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Policy development commonly vacillates between endorsement of evidence-based practices and reliance on political or social ideology. Although evidence-based practices can usually unseat false beliefs over time, they also fall victim readily to newly emerging beliefs. The history of Drug Courts exemplifies this process writ large. Created largely in response to the failed War on Drugs of the 1980s, Drug Courts deliver community-based substance abuse treatment and correctional supervision for drug-addicted individuals in lieu of criminal prosecution or incarceration (National Association of Drug Court Professionals [NADCP], 1997). Since their founding in 1989, more research has been conducted on the effects of Drug Courts than on any other substance abuse treatment or criminal justice program. As reviewed below, a large body of evidence proves not only that Drug Courts work, but how they work and for what types of drug-addicted individuals. Studies have identified specific practices within Drug Courts that double their effectiveness and increase their cost-effectiveness by more than half (Carey et al., 2012; NADCP, 2013; Zweig et al., 2012). The unprecedented success of Drug Courts made them an exemplar of evidence-based practices for the criminal justice system. Other programs modeled some of their interventions after Drug Courts and achieved similarly favorable results. For example, pre-trial supervision programs such as the 24/7 Sobriety Project (Kilmer et al., 2012), prosecutorial programs such as D.T.A.P. (Drug Treatment as an Alternative to Prison) (Crime Solutions, n.d.), and probation programs such as Project H.O.P.E. (Honest Opportunity Probation with Enforcement) (Hawken and Kleiman, 2009) borrowed elements from the Drug Court model - substance abuse treatment, drug and alcohol testing, and/or gradually increasing sanctions and rewards - and proved effective at reducing crime and substance abuse significantly. After 25 years of proven accomplishments, Drug Courts now face existential challenges which threaten to undermine their viability and utility. In their haste to undo the damage wrought by the War on Drugs, policy advocates are ignoring basic lessons derived from Drug Courts and other evidence-based programs, diluting the core ingredients of these programs, and promoting a policy environment which removes some of the requisite conditions for Drug Courts to succeed. If history is any guide (and it always is), the failure of these untested efforts to protect public health and public safety could herald the return of punitive sentencing policies akin to those discredited in the War on Drugs. Background More than 80 percent of persons charged with criminal offenses in the U.S. abuse illicit substances (National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse, 2010) and nearly half are addicted to drugs or alcohol (Fazel et al., 2006; Karberg and James, 2005). Continued substance abuse is associated with a two- to four-fold increase in the likelihood of criminal recidivism (Bennett et al., 2008). Providing substance abuse treatment reduces recidivism substantially (Holloway et al., 2006; Chandler et al., 2009); however, unless they receive intensive supervision and consequences for noncompliance, more than three-quarters of persons referred to treatment by the criminal justice system will refuse to attend treatment or drop out prematurely (Marlowe, 2002; Sung et al., 2004; University of California at Los Angeles, 2007). In fact, the more individuals need treatment and the greater their likelihood of recidivism, the less likely they are to comply with treatment (Olver et al., 2011). 193Mandatory sentencing policies such as the War on Drugs have produced similarly minimal gains (Cullen et al., 2011). More than two-thirds of drug-involved inmates commit a new crime within three years of release from jail or prison, approximately half are returned to custody for a new offense or technical violation, and over 80 percent resume illicit drug or alcohol abuse (Durose et al., 2014; Green and Winik, 2010; Marlowe, 2002; Spohn and Holleran, 2002). Drug Courts were created to enhance compliance with community-based substance abuse treatment. The Drug Court judge leads a multidisciplinary team of professionals, which includes a prosecutor, defense attorney, community supervision officer, and substance abuse and mental health treatment providers (NADCP, 1997). Participants are required to complete substance abuse treatment and other indicated services, undergo random weekly drug and alcohol testing, and attend frequent status hearings in court, during which the judge reviews their progress in treatment and imposes consequences contingent upon their performance. The consequences may include desired rewards (e.g. verbal praise, reduced supervision requirements, or token gifts), punitive sanctions (e.g. writing assignments, community service, or brief jail detention) or modifications to the participant's treatment plan (e.g. transfer to a more intensive level of care). In pre-adjudication Drug Courts, the criminal charge(s) are withdrawn and the offense may be expunged from the participant's record. Although the offense may not be erased literally from criminal justice databases, expungement entitles the individual to respond truthfully on an employment application or similar document that the arrest or conviction did not occur (Festinger et al., 2005). In post-adjudication Drug Courts, graduates avoid incarceration or reduce the length or conditions of probation. Effectiveness of drug courts Seven meta-analyses 1 (Drake et al., 2009; Gutierrez and Bourgon, 2012; Lowenkamp et al., 2005; MacKenzie, 2006; Mitchell et al., 2012; Shaffer, 2010; Wilson et al., 2006), a national multisite study (Rossman et al., 2011) and several systematic reviews (e.g. Belenko, 2002; Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2005; Marlowe, 2011; National Institute of Justice, 2006) have concluded that Drug Courts significantly reduce crime (typically measured by re-arrest rates) by an average of 8 to 14 percent. The studies have included several randomized controlled experiments (Breckenridge et al., 2000; Gottfredson et al., 2003; Harrell et al., 1999; Jones, 2013; MacDonald et al., 2007; Turner et al., 1999) and dozens of quasi-experiments (Mitchell et al., 2012). The effects on recidivism have been determined to last at least three years after entry (Gottfredson et al., 2005; Mitchell et al., 2012; Turner et al., 1999) and one study reported effects lasting more than 14 years (Finigan et al., 2007). 194Because these figures reflect averages, they mask substantial variability in the performance of individual Drug Courts. Approximately three-quarters of the Drug Courts that were studied reduced crime significantly (Shaffer, 2006), with the best Drug Courts reducing crime by 35 percent to 50 percent (Carey et al., 2012; Carey and Waller, 2011; Lowenkamp et al., 2005; Shaffer, 2006). A sizeable minority (22 percent) of Drug Courts, however, was determined to have no impact on crime (Shaffer, 2006) and a small proportion (6 percent) were associated with increases in crime (Lowenkamp et al., 2005). As will be discussed, studies have revealed that poorly performing Drug Courts typically delivered ineffective or contraindicated services, or targeted their services to the wrong types of individuals who did not require those services (Carey et al., 2012; Gutierrez and Bourgon, 2012; Marlowe, 2012a; Zweig et al., 2012). A recent national study of 23 adult Drug Courts, called the Multisite Adult Drug Court Evaluation (MADCE), examined a wide range of outcomes beyond recidivism in Drug Courts. In addition to reducing crime, the MADCE found that Drug Courts significantly reduced illicit drug and alcohol use and improved participants' family interactions (Rossman et al., 2011). For example, 29 percent of the Drug Court participants tested positive by saliva testing for illicit drugs and/or alcohol at 18 months post-admission, compared with 46 percent of a carefully matched comparison sample (p < .01). Drug Courts have also proven to be highly cost-effective. The MADCE and two meta-analyses concluded that Drug Courts produce an average of more than $2 in direct benefits to the criminal justice system for every $1 invested (Bhati et al., 2008; Downey and Roman, 2010; Rossman et al., 2011). These savings reflect tangible cost-offsets resulting from reduced re-arrests, law enforcement contacts, court hearings, use of jail or prison beds, and crime victimization. When more distal offsets were also taken into account, such as savings from reduced healthcare and foster care utilization, studies have reported economic benefits ranging from approximately $2 to $27 for every $1 invested (Carey et al., 2006; Finigan et al., 2007; Lee et al., 2012; Loman, 2004). The net result has been economic savings to local communities ranging from approximately $3,000 to $13,000 per participant (Aos et al., 2006; Carey et al., 2006; Finigan et al., 2007; Lee et al., 2012; Logan et al., 2004; Loman, 2004). Target population According to the criminological theory of the Risk Principle, intensive programs such as Drug Courts are hypothesized to produce the greatest benefits for high-risk individuals who have more severe antisocial propensities or treatment-refractory histories; however, such programs may be unnecessary or counterproductive for low-risk individuals (Andrews and Bonta, 2010). Low-risk individuals are, by definition, less likely to be on a fixed antisocial trajectory and are predisposed to improve their conduct following a run-in with the law. Therefore, intensive interventions offer small incremental benefits for these individuals but at a substantial cost (DeMatteo et al., 2006). Worse, low-risk individuals often adopt antisocial attitudes and behaviors from associating with high-risk peers, which makes their outcomes worse (Lloyd et al., 2014; Welsh and Rocque, 2014). 195The Risk Principle has been validated reliably in Drug Courts. Drug Courts reduce crime approximately twice as much and are 50 percent more cost-effective when they treat high-risk participants as compared to low-risk participants (Marlowe, 2012a). The effects of Drug Courts are particularly pronounced for high-risk individuals who are younger, have more prior felony convictions, have been diagnosed with antisocial personality disorder, or failed previously in substance abuse treatment (Festinger et al., 2002; Fielding et al., 2002; Lowenkamp et al., 2005; Marlowe et al., 2007). Fidelity to the model In fiscally challenging times, there is always pressure to do more with less. This pressure raises important questions about whether some of the components of the Drug Court model can be dropped or the dosage reduced without eroding the benefits. The "Key Components" of Drug Courts (NADCP, 1997) are hypothesized to include a frequent schedule of judicial status hearings, weekly drug and alcohol testing, progressively escalating rewards for achievements and sanctions for infractions, and an intensive regimen of substance abuse treatment. Each of these components has been studied carefully and proven to be pivotal for achieving positive outcomes for high-risk, drug-addicted individuals. Studies involving more than 100 Drug Courts have examined whether the average effect size (ES) for Drug Court increases or decreases significantly depending on how particular services, such as court hearings or treatment sessions, are structured and delivered. 2 Among other findings, these studies found that the ES for Drug Court is nearly double in magnitude when the program adheres to the practices listed below (Carey et al., 2012; Zweig et al., 2012). The evidence supporting these practices is so strong that the field adopted these practices as an enforceable standard of care for Drug Courts (NADCP, 2013). Participants appear in court for status hearings no less frequently than every two weeks for the first phase of the program, and monthly thereafter for the remainder of the first year of treatment. Participants receive a minimum of 200 hours of cognitive-behavioral addiction counseling over a period of at least 12 months. In addition to group counseling, participants receive individual counseling or clinical case management at least twice per week for the first several months of the program. Participants are tested for drug and alcohol use no less frequently than twice per week on a random basis for at least the first year of the program. Participants receive gradually escalating sanctions for illicit substance use, and jail sanctions for substance use are ordinarily no more than 3 to 5 days in length. Participants receive gradually increasing rewards for achievements in the program, such as providing negative drug tests and attending counseling sessions. 196 The policy environment With unambiguous proof that Drug Courts protect public safety, improve public health and return substantial cost-savings to taxpayers, one would expect them to be endorsed wholeheartedly by policymakers and the public at large. In fact, endorsement of Drug Courts has followed a circuitous path. In the early years, critics of Drug Courts were primarily "law and order" advocates who viewed the programs as potentially soft on crime. Proponents tended to be critics of the War on Drugs who favored almost any community alternative to incarceration. The public, for the most part, was unaware of what a Drug Court was or why they were needed. Over the ensuing 25 years, scientific support for Drug Courts gradually caught the attention of policymakers and slowly permeated the public's consciousness. The number of Drug Courts in the U.S. increased from one in 1989 to nearly 3,000 in 2014 (Huddleston and Marlowe, in press) and Drug Courts have been started or are in the planning stages in approximately 30 other countries (Marlowe, 2012b). Financial appropriations for Drug Courts increased in lockstep with their growth in numbers. Despite the 2008 economic recession in the U.S. and concomitant state budget crises, state and federal appropriations for Drug Courts held steady or continued to rise and topped $350 million by 2012 (Huddleston and Marlowe, in press). Much of this growth was fueled by emerging scientific evidence demonstrating the positive impacts of Drug Courts. Politically conservative groups, who were initially cool to the idea of Drug Courts, took notice of the fact that they reduce crime (an important yardstick for law and order advocates), save money (a critical benchmark for fiscal conservatives), and hold individuals accountable for contributing to their own recovery (a touchstone for social conservatives). Leading conservative think tanks, such as the Texas Public Policy Foundation (n.d.), endorsed Drug Courts as a rational building block for evidence-based drug policy and criminal-justice policy reforms. Victims' rights groups such as M.A.D.D. (n.d.) also endorsed Drug Courts as a responsible approach to dealing with recidivist intoxicated drivers and other public safety threats. Science and policy were firmly in sync. Drug Courts also fit comfortably into the national narrative in the U.S. about the proper role of the federal government. Local court administration is a function of state and county governments, and some commentators questioned why federal agencies should fund these programs. The simplest response is that the programs work. Rarely has federal seed funding proved to be so demonstrably successful, and rarely have state and local governments picked up the tab after federal funding dried up. As federal seed monies ended, state and county governments continued to fund Drug Courts at consistent or increasing levels, in some cases for decades. It is estimated that each dollar contributed by the federal government has elicited more than $3 of ensuing state and county appropriations; more than $9 when in-kind contributions, such as donated judicial and court clerk time, are taken into account (Huddleston, 2007). 197Recently, however, the political zeitgeist has shifted markedly. The abject failure of the War on Drugs, which set the stage for Drug Courts to arise and thrive, has given rise to newer policy proposals which may contribute to the demise of Drug Courts and other evidence-based programs. Most policy analysts agree that the mandatory sentencing provisions of the War on Drugs were ineffective, harmful and costly. Crime rates did not budge, families and communities (especially low-income and racial-minority families and communities) were decimated, and state budgets buckled under enormous correctional expenditures (Jensen et al., 2004). Drug Courts helped to ameliorate these problems but they may have been too little too late (Drug Policy Alliance [DPA], 2011; National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, 2009; Justice Policy Institute [JPI], 2011). At the height of their funding, Drug Courts have reached 5 percent to 10 percent of eligible drug-addicted persons (Bhati et al., 2008; Huddleston and Marlowe, 2011). This level of penetration is simply insufficient to undo the devastation wrought by the War on Drugs (Lilley, 2013; Sevigney et al., 2013). Policymakers and the public began to look for simpler, cheaper and faster measures. They found them in the decriminalization and legalization movements. The logic of decriminalization is (seemingly) simple. If incarceration is ineffective and harmful, then perhaps the best alternative is to reduce or remove criminal penalties altogether. According to this view, the criminal justice system cannot be counted on to reform itself; rather, it is oriented inexorably toward maintaining and extending the status quo (Bach, 2009; Perkinson, 2010). Reform must come from the grassroots and not from innovative justice programming. This sentiment found company in the views of constituencies seeking to rectify racial and ethnic disparities in the criminal justice system (O'Hear, 2009; Wolf, 2009). The War on Drugs unquestionably burdened racial-minority and poor citizens disproportionately (Jensen et al., 2004; Marlowe, 2013). The answer for some advocates is to dismantle this unfair framework and reduce the possibility of criminal justice system entanglements (Alexander, 2010). Any correctional rehabilitation program, no matter how well intentioned or effective, is viewed by these advocates as part of the problem rather than the solution because it criminalizes "victimless behavior" and treats sickness as deviance (DPA, 2011; Tiger, 2013). The upshot of these sentiments has been the steady decriminalization of drug-possession offenses in many states, de-felonization of a wide range of theft and property crimes (reducing the crimes from felonies to misdemeanors), and providing "good-time credits" and other sentence reductions irrespective of whether individuals are, in fact, compliant with the conditions of their criminal justice supervision (California Proposition 47, 2014; Couzens, 2013; Vera Institute of Justice, 2012). 198Drug Courts cannot function nearly as effectively in this new policy environment as they have in the past. The typical Drug Court curriculum is 12 to 18 months in duration. This is because, as was noted earlier, studies have determined that a minimum of 12 months of treatment (including 200 hours of counseling) is necessary to achieve beneficial results. If the typical sentence for a misdemeanor offense is six to 12 months, and most probationers can have their sentences shortened further via unearned credits, it will be the rare individual who enters a Drug Court voluntarily. The more severely addicted the person and the greater the risk of recidivism, the less likely the person will enter Drug Court (Olver et al., 2011). Intrinsic motivation for treatment is the hallmark of a low-risk individual who is already predisposed to change for the better. It is the serious and recalcitrant offender who needs Drug Court the most but is least likely to recognize this fact. Science leaves little question that the severity of the presumptive or alternative sentence is critical to the success of Drug Courts and similar criminal justice programs (Carey et al., 2012; Gottfredson et al., 2003; Mitchell et al., 2012; Rossman et al., 2011; Shaffer, 2010; Zweig et al., 2012). Drug Courts work, in part, by applying the leverage of a potential jail or prison sentence to keep unmotivated persons engaged in community treatment. Without this "carrot and stick," retention in treatment is unacceptably poor and recovery dishearteningly rare (Coviello et al., 2012; Gregoire and Burke, 2004; Hser et al., 2001; Kelly et al., 2005; Perron and Bright, 2008). The destructive pressures facing Drug Courts are, by no means, the product of disillusionment with Drug Courts. Although a minority of commentators continue to challenge the scientific basis for Drug Courts (DPA, 2011; JPI, 2011), these outliers are becoming less and less vocal as proof of Drug Courts' efficacy accumulates. The dangerous waters surrounding Drug Courts were spawned not by critics, but by like-minded groups who similarly detest the punitive impacts of the War on Drugs and the unfair racial disparities it engendered. What these well-intentioned groups fail to understand, however, is that sentiments are not the same as facts, and goals are not the same as methods. Their understandable impatience to undo the damage caused by past policies has led them to turn a blind eye to empirical evidence. No matter how one justifies the course of action, abdicating responsibility for treating and supervising seriously ill and self-destructive persons is not a new policy. It is the absence of a policy. Conclusion The most destructive policies are often backed by constituencies with unquestioned moral aims, ardent fervor for positive change, and a great deal of money to spend on political campaigns. When these same constituencies lack knowledge about scientific reasoning, their actions may be unconstrained by logic and unmoved by proof. At present, there is not a shred of evidence to support decriminalization, de-felonization, or similar policy initiatives (Laqueur, 2014). This lack of supporting evidence should give proponents pause for reflection and policymakers and the public cause for concern; it has, however, failed to ebb the pace of reform. Laws are being rewritten at a furious rate with no way to predict or prepare for the consequences (Pennypacker and Thompson, 2014). 199When public or private entities seek to build new industries or plants, they are often required to hire independent experts to prepare an environmental impact statement. This process ensures the public is not injured by unintended and unforeseen consequences of the planned course of action. An analogous process should be followed for proposed legislation which could have unforeseen impacts on the policy landscape. Before lawmakers pass sweeping criminal justice reforms, they should be expected to engage independent experts to examine the potential impacts of those reforms on evidence-based programs which are delivering proven benefits to public health and safety. Policymakers would, of course, be free to ignore such impacts and pass the reforms regardless of the effects; nevertheless, they should be required to deliberate about foreseeable impacts before embarking on a course of action. Ideology should not be permitted to usurp more than 25 years of research on best practices without at least some consideration of the potential repercussions. Taking empirical evidence of effectiveness into account before drafting legislation is the definition of rational policy reform.