Case 1 : Coffee market

An empirical study by Huang, Siegfried and Zardoshty3estimated a demand function for coffee in the United States between 1961 and 1977, using quarterly time-series data. The results were:

ln Qt= 1.2789 - 0.1647 ln Pt+ 0.5115 ln Yt+ 0.1483 ln Pt0- 0.0089 T - 0.0961D1- 0.1570D2-0.0097D3

(- 2.14) (1.23) (0.55) (-3.326) (-3.74) (-6.03) (-0.37)

where

Q = pounds of coffee consumed per head

P = the relative price of coffee per pound at 1967 prices

Y = per capita personal disposable income (in $,000 at 1967 prices)

P0= the relative price of tea per quarter pound at 1967 prices

T= thetrendfactor,withT=1for1961-ItoT=66for 1977-II

D1= 1 for the first quarter

D2= 1 for the second quarter

D3= 1 for the third quarter

Questions

1 Interpret the PED for coffee; does price significantly affect consumption?

2 Interpret the YED for coffee; does income significantly affect consumption?

3 Interpret the CED between tea and coffee; does the price of tea significantly affect the consumption of coffee?

4 Why do you think that advertising expenditure is omitted from the equation?

5 Interpret the trend factor.

6 Interpret the seasonal pattern in coffee consumption in the USA.

7 How well does the model fit the data?

Case 1 : Oil market

OPEC has surprised the markets with an output cut of 900,000 barrels per day, to take effect at the beginning of March. Observers had expected the oil producers' cartel to hold its quotas steady because production in Iraq has been hit by sabotage.

Before the regular meeting of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in Vienna on Wednesday September 24th, most of the drama was provided by Hugo Cha vez, the Venezuelan president, who opined that the Iraq representative should not have been at the get-together because he was an illegitimate stooge of American occupiers. If that is so, Ibrahim Bahr al-Uloum behaved very oddly. His bullish predictions that Iraq could produce at least 3.5m barrels per day (bpd) by 2020 seem to have been among the factors that persuaded the ten members of OPEC's quota system to approve a surprise production cut of 900,000 bpd, to 24.5m bpd.

The effect of the cut was to send oil prices sharply higher. Equities in America retreated on fears that a higher oil price could stymie the incipient economic recovery: the Dow Jones Industrial Average of 30 leading shares fell by 1.57% that day.

In their official communique , OPEC's oil ministers pointed to their expectation of a 'contra-seasonal stock build-up' at the end of this year and the beginning of next year. Normally, oil stocks decline over the winter in the northern hemisphere, thanks to heavy use of heating oil. But this year, demand for oil, according to OPEC, will grow merely at its 'normal, seasonal' level, despite an improving world economy. OPEC expects supply to grow faster than demand, thanks to continued increases in production from Iraq and non-OPEC countries (of which Russia, the world's second-biggest oil exporter, is the most important).

OPEC expects this supply-demand mismatch to translate into a stock increase of 600,000 bpd in the final quarter of this year. This contrasts with an estimated stock reduction of 500,000 bpd in the final quarter of 2011, and 1m bpd in the last quarter of 2012. Larry Goldstein, president of the Petroleum Industry Research Foundation, believes OPEC has got its sums wrong. In remarks to the Wall Street Journal, he said he thought stocks would be flat over the coming three months.

Although the communique did not explicitly say so, OPEC members are keen to keep worldwide oil stocks below their ten-year average. That would give the cartel more power to determine the price. American oil stocks have been creeping up again after hitting 26-year lows earlier this year. America's energy secretary, Spencer Abraham, was clearly disappointed by OPEC's move, saying: 'Sustained global economic growth requires abundant supplies of energy. The US believes oil prices should be set by market forces in order to ensure adequate supplies.' America's opposition Democrats have been even more outspoken. Last month, they publicly rebuked Saudi Arabia, OPEC's (and the world's) leading producer, for reducing exports in August, thus causing an unpopular rise in American petrol prices.

Some observers are also speculating that OPEC may be sneakily trying to shift its price target above the current $32-38 range (per barrel, for a basket of Middle Eastern crudes, which tend to trade a couple of dollars below West Texas crude). After all, the oil price has been well within that range for the past few months. Why cut production when current supply levels are achieving their aim? In fact, the oil price has stayed higher than many expected: it was widely expected to fall well below $30 per barrel after the end of the Iraq war. However, unrest in Nigeria, a big producer, and the continuing attacks on Iraq's oil facilities put paid to that.

OPEC's fears about non-OPEC production may be well-founded. After decades of communism, the industry in Russia is ramping up output: so far this year, it has been pumping an average of 800,000 bpd more than last year. Oil and gas are the country's biggest exports, earning hard currency that is seen as a key ingredient of economic revival. Moreover, the oil industry is in private hands, so even if the government in Moscow wanted to put a lid on production, it has less influence over its oil companies than OPEC governments have over theirs. The president of OPEC, Abdullah bin Hamad al-Attiyah, told the Wall Street Journal that the cartel would not cut production below 24m bpd unless big oil exporters outside OPEC, including Mexico and Norway as well as Russia, were prepared to cut production too.

OPEC's stance on Iraq is very different. Here, the cartel seems to be taking an overly rosy view. Iraq says it is currently producing around 1.8m bpd, well below the 2.5m bpd that it was pumping before the country was invaded in the spring (and even that was well below its potential, owing to years of sanctions). Moreover, exports, which are a crucial source of revenue for reconstruction, are still running at only about 500,000 bpd, compared with 2m bpd before the war. These have been seriously disrupted, and continue to be threatened by sabotage. Currently, oil is being exported mainly through the north: the southern ports on the Gulf coast are operating far below capacity.

For those who take OPEC's optimistic view of Iraqi production at face value, the cartel's move should not have come as a surprise. But the sharp reaction from oil markets and stockmarkets suggests it did. Many speculators had sold oil in the futures market, or 'shorted' it, expecting the price to fall in the short term - they clearly weren't expecting a big cut in output quotas any time soon. According to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the American regulator for commodity futures markets, the increase in short positions over September was equivalent to 470,000 barrels of oil. OPEC's decision led to a scramble to 'cover' such positions by buying oil. Whether prices stay higher will depend on two key factors. Will OPEC members stick to their new quotas? (They have a history of cheating.) And will Iraqi militants continue to destroy their own country's wells and pipelines?

Questions

1. OPEC currently produces about 38 per cent of the world output of oil. Assuming the short-term price elasticity of demand is 0.28, estimate the effect of the output cut on the current price, stating any assumptions in your calculations.

2. Describe the factors currently driving the world demand for oil; why has the price not fallen below the $30 level as many expected?

3. Explain the effect of other non-OPEC producers on the cartel's output decisions.