CASE 10 Hurricane Katrina As we have noted in the text, until approximately What is unique about the devastation that 1970, nearly all engineering codes of ethics held that befell the New Orleans area from Hurricane the engineer's first duty is fidelity to his or her Katrina-compared to other natural disastersis employer and clients. However, soon after 1970, that much of the destruction was the result of most codes insisted that "Engineers shall hold para- engineering and engineering-related policy failures. mount the safety, health, and welfare of the public. Whatever may have precipitated this change in the From an engineering standpoint, the panel asserts, early 1970s, recent events ranging from the collapse there was an overestimation of soil strength that ren- of Manhattan's Twin Towers on September 11, 2001, dered the levees more vulnerable than they should to the collapse of a major bridge in Minneapolis/St. have been, a failure to satisfy standard factors of safety Paul on August 1, 2007-make apparent the vital in the original designs of the levees and pumps, and a importance of this principle. The devastation wreaked failure to determine and communicate clearly to the by Hurricane Katrina along the Gulf of Mexico coast public and the city leaders the level of hurricane risk line states of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama in to which the city and its residents were exposed. The late August 2005 is also a dramatic case in point. panel concludes, Hardest hit was Louisiana, which endured the loss of more than 1,000 lives, thousands of homes, damage With the benefit of hindsight, we now see that questionable engineering decisions and manage- to residential and nonresidential property of more than ment choices, and inadequate interfaces within $20 billion, and damage to public infrastructure esti- and between organizations, all contributed to the mated at nearly $7 billion. Most severely damaged problem. was the city of New Orleans, much of which had to This might suggest that blame-responsibility is be evacuated and which suffered the loss of more than in order. However, the panel chose not to pursue 100,000 jobs. The city is still recovering, apparently this line, pointing out instead the difficulty of having permanently lost much of its population and assigning blame: Only slowly recovering previously habitable areas. No one person or decision is to blame. T' At the request of the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers engineering failures were complex, and involv SACE), the American Society of Civil Engineers numerous decisions by many people within man (ASCE) formed the Hurricane Katrina External Review organizations over a long period of time. Panel to review the comprehensive work of USACE's Rather than attempt to assign blame, the panel Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force. The used the hindsight it acquired to make recommenda- resulting ASCE report, The New Orleans Hurricane tions about the future. The report identifies a set of Protection System: What Went Wrong and Why, is a critical actions the panel regards as necessary. These detailed and eloquent statement of the ethical respon- actions fall under one of four needed shifts in thought sibilities of engineers to protect public safety, health, and approach: and welfare." Improve the understanding of risk and firmly The ASCE report documents engineering failures, commit to safety. organizational and policy failures, and lessons learned for the future. Chapter 7 of the report ("Direct Causes Re-evaluate and repair the hurricane protection of the Catastrophe") begins as follows: system Copyrights Compleaning. All erved. My ma le couple watcm, while or in purs. Due to decide vie, come tul pary come my eyes t o unde aperte CASE 10 - Hurricane Katrina 221 Reorganize the management of the hurricane protection system. Insist on engineering quality. The first recommended action is that safety be kept at the forefront of public priorities, preparing for the possibility of future hurricanes rather than allowing experts and citizens alike to fall into a complacency that can come from the relative unlikelihood of a repeat performance in the near future. In addition, the panel recommended making clear and quantifiable risk estimates and communicating them to the public in ways that enable nonexperts to have a real voice in determining the acceptability or unacceptability of those risks. Recommended actions related to re-evaluating and repairing damaged components of the existing infrastructure include a broad look at the whole infra- structure system, identifying weak links, and repairing damaged components and where needed, repurposing components to work better as a system. The next set of recommendations concerns rethinking the haphazard, uncoordinated hurricane protection system with a truly organized, coherent system. This, the panel believes, calls for "good lead- ership, management, and someone in charge. It is the panel's recommendation that a high-level licensed engineer, or a panel of highly qualified, licensed engi- neers, be appointed with full authority to oversee the Recommendations intended to "demand engi- neering quality relate to the upgrading and review of design procedures. The panel points out that "ASCE has a long standing policy that recommends indepen dent external peer review of public works projects where performance is critical to public safety, health, and welfare. This is especially so where reliability under emergency conditions is critical, as it clearly was when Hurricane Katrina struck. The effective operation of such an external review process, the panel concludes, could have resulted in a significant reduction in the amount of but by no means all) destruction in the case of Hurricane Katrina The panel's final recommendation is essentially a reminder of our limitations and a consequent ethical imperative to place safety first Although the conditions leading up to the New Orleans catastrophe are unique, the fundamental constraints placed on engineers for any project are not. Every project has funding and/or schedule limitations. Every project must integrate into the natural and man-made environment. Every major project has political ramifications In the face of pressure to save money or to make up time, engineers must remain strong and hold true to the requirements of the profession's canon of ethics, never compromising the safety of the public. The panel concludes with an appeal to a broader application of the first Fundamental Canon of ASCE's Code of Ethics. Not only must the commitment to pro- tect public safety, health, and welfare be the guiring principle for New Orleans hurricane protections tem but also it must be applied with equal rigor every aspect of an engineer's work-in New Orleans, in America, and throughout the world. Reading the panel's report in its entirety would be a valuable exercise in thinking through what ASCE's first Fundamental Canon requires not only regarding the Hurricane Katrina disaster but also regarding other basic responsibilities to the public that are inher- ent in engineering practice. A related reading is "Leadership, Service Leam- ing and Executive Management in Engineering: The Rowan University Hurricane Katrina Recovery Team" by a team of engineering students and faculty advisors at Rowan University. In their abstract, the system: The authority's overarching responsibility will be to keep hurricane-related safety at the forefront of public priorities. The authority will provide lead- ership, strategic vision, definition of roles and responsibilities, formalized avenues of communi cation, prioritization of funding, and coordination of critical construction, maintenance, and operations The panel also recommended improving inter agency coordination. The historical record thus far, the panel maintains, is disorganization and poor hanisms for interagency communication Those responsible for maintenance of the hurri- cane protection system must collaborate with sys- tem designers and constructors to upgrade their inspection, repair, and operations to ensure that the system is hurricane-ready and flood-ready. 222 Cases plants or businesses in the afflicted areas." Engineers have played a prominent role in these relief efforts, as they did after the 9/11 Twin Towers attack and the Asian tsunami disaster. Hafner and Deutsch comment authors identify three objectives for the Hurricane Katrina Recovery Team Project: The main objective is to help distressed commu- nities in the Gulf Coast Region. Second, this proj- ect seeks to not only address broader social issues but also leave a tangible contribution or impact in the area while asking the following questions: What do we as professional engineers have as a responsibility to the communities we serve, and what do we leave in the community to make it a better, more equitable place to live? The last objective is the management team's successful assessment of the experience, including several logistical challenges. To this end, this article seeks to help other student-led projects by relay- ing our service learning experience in a coherent, user-friendly manner that serves as a model experience. With two disasters behind them, some companies are applying lessons they have learned to their hurricane-related philanthropy. GE is a case in point. During the tsunami, the company put together a team of 50 project engineers-experts in portable water purification, energy, health care, and medical equipment. After Hurricane Katrina, GE executives took their cues from Jeffrey R. Immelt, GE's chief exec- utive, and reactivated the same tsunami team for New Orleans. "Jeff told us, 'Don't let anything stand in the way of getting aid where it's needed," said Robert Corcoran, vice president for corporate citizenship. Discuss how, with corporate backing, engineers who subscribe to Fred Cuny's ideas about effective disaster relief in his Disasters and Development (Oxford University Press, 1983) might approach the engineering challenges of Katrina. Corporate Responses Supportive corporate responses to the Hurricane Katrina were swift. By mid-September 2005, more than $312 million worth of aid had been donated by major corporations, much of it by those with no CASE 10 Hurricane Katrina As we have noted in the text, until approximately What is unique about the devastation that 1970, nearly all engineering codes of ethics held that befell the New Orleans area from Hurricane the engineer's first duty is fidelity to his or her Katrina-compared to other natural disastersis employer and clients. However, soon after 1970, that much of the destruction was the result of most codes insisted that "Engineers shall hold para- engineering and engineering-related policy failures. mount the safety, health, and welfare of the public. Whatever may have precipitated this change in the From an engineering standpoint, the panel asserts, early 1970s, recent events ranging from the collapse there was an overestimation of soil strength that ren- of Manhattan's Twin Towers on September 11, 2001, dered the levees more vulnerable than they should to the collapse of a major bridge in Minneapolis/St. have been, a failure to satisfy standard factors of safety Paul on August 1, 2007-make apparent the vital in the original designs of the levees and pumps, and a importance of this principle. The devastation wreaked failure to determine and communicate clearly to the by Hurricane Katrina along the Gulf of Mexico coast public and the city leaders the level of hurricane risk line states of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama in to which the city and its residents were exposed. The late August 2005 is also a dramatic case in point. panel concludes, Hardest hit was Louisiana, which endured the loss of more than 1,000 lives, thousands of homes, damage With the benefit of hindsight, we now see that questionable engineering decisions and manage- to residential and nonresidential property of more than ment choices, and inadequate interfaces within $20 billion, and damage to public infrastructure esti- and between organizations, all contributed to the mated at nearly $7 billion. Most severely damaged problem. was the city of New Orleans, much of which had to This might suggest that blame-responsibility is be evacuated and which suffered the loss of more than in order. However, the panel chose not to pursue 100,000 jobs. The city is still recovering, apparently this line, pointing out instead the difficulty of having permanently lost much of its population and assigning blame: Only slowly recovering previously habitable areas. No one person or decision is to blame. T' At the request of the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers engineering failures were complex, and involv SACE), the American Society of Civil Engineers numerous decisions by many people within man (ASCE) formed the Hurricane Katrina External Review organizations over a long period of time. Panel to review the comprehensive work of USACE's Rather than attempt to assign blame, the panel Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force. The used the hindsight it acquired to make recommenda- resulting ASCE report, The New Orleans Hurricane tions about the future. The report identifies a set of Protection System: What Went Wrong and Why, is a critical actions the panel regards as necessary. These detailed and eloquent statement of the ethical respon- actions fall under one of four needed shifts in thought sibilities of engineers to protect public safety, health, and approach: and welfare." Improve the understanding of risk and firmly The ASCE report documents engineering failures, commit to safety. organizational and policy failures, and lessons learned for the future. Chapter 7 of the report ("Direct Causes Re-evaluate and repair the hurricane protection of the Catastrophe") begins as follows: system Copyrights Compleaning. All erved. My ma le couple watcm, while or in purs. Due to decide vie, come tul pary come my eyes t o unde aperte CASE 10 - Hurricane Katrina 221 Reorganize the management of the hurricane protection system. Insist on engineering quality. The first recommended action is that safety be kept at the forefront of public priorities, preparing for the possibility of future hurricanes rather than allowing experts and citizens alike to fall into a complacency that can come from the relative unlikelihood of a repeat performance in the near future. In addition, the panel recommended making clear and quantifiable risk estimates and communicating them to the public in ways that enable nonexperts to have a real voice in determining the acceptability or unacceptability of those risks. Recommended actions related to re-evaluating and repairing damaged components of the existing infrastructure include a broad look at the whole infra- structure system, identifying weak links, and repairing damaged components and where needed, repurposing components to work better as a system. The next set of recommendations concerns rethinking the haphazard, uncoordinated hurricane protection system with a truly organized, coherent system. This, the panel believes, calls for "good lead- ership, management, and someone in charge. It is the panel's recommendation that a high-level licensed engineer, or a panel of highly qualified, licensed engi- neers, be appointed with full authority to oversee the Recommendations intended to "demand engi- neering quality relate to the upgrading and review of design procedures. The panel points out that "ASCE has a long standing policy that recommends indepen dent external peer review of public works projects where performance is critical to public safety, health, and welfare. This is especially so where reliability under emergency conditions is critical, as it clearly was when Hurricane Katrina struck. The effective operation of such an external review process, the panel concludes, could have resulted in a significant reduction in the amount of but by no means all) destruction in the case of Hurricane Katrina The panel's final recommendation is essentially a reminder of our limitations and a consequent ethical imperative to place safety first Although the conditions leading up to the New Orleans catastrophe are unique, the fundamental constraints placed on engineers for any project are not. Every project has funding and/or schedule limitations. Every project must integrate into the natural and man-made environment. Every major project has political ramifications In the face of pressure to save money or to make up time, engineers must remain strong and hold true to the requirements of the profession's canon of ethics, never compromising the safety of the public. The panel concludes with an appeal to a broader application of the first Fundamental Canon of ASCE's Code of Ethics. Not only must the commitment to pro- tect public safety, health, and welfare be the guiring principle for New Orleans hurricane protections tem but also it must be applied with equal rigor every aspect of an engineer's work-in New Orleans, in America, and throughout the world. Reading the panel's report in its entirety would be a valuable exercise in thinking through what ASCE's first Fundamental Canon requires not only regarding the Hurricane Katrina disaster but also regarding other basic responsibilities to the public that are inher- ent in engineering practice. A related reading is "Leadership, Service Leam- ing and Executive Management in Engineering: The Rowan University Hurricane Katrina Recovery Team" by a team of engineering students and faculty advisors at Rowan University. In their abstract, the system: The authority's overarching responsibility will be to keep hurricane-related safety at the forefront of public priorities. The authority will provide lead- ership, strategic vision, definition of roles and responsibilities, formalized avenues of communi cation, prioritization of funding, and coordination of critical construction, maintenance, and operations The panel also recommended improving inter agency coordination. The historical record thus far, the panel maintains, is disorganization and poor hanisms for interagency communication Those responsible for maintenance of the hurri- cane protection system must collaborate with sys- tem designers and constructors to upgrade their inspection, repair, and operations to ensure that the system is hurricane-ready and flood-ready. 222 Cases plants or businesses in the afflicted areas." Engineers have played a prominent role in these relief efforts, as they did after the 9/11 Twin Towers attack and the Asian tsunami disaster. Hafner and Deutsch comment authors identify three objectives for the Hurricane Katrina Recovery Team Project: The main objective is to help distressed commu- nities in the Gulf Coast Region. Second, this proj- ect seeks to not only address broader social issues but also leave a tangible contribution or impact in the area while asking the following questions: What do we as professional engineers have as a responsibility to the communities we serve, and what do we leave in the community to make it a better, more equitable place to live? The last objective is the management team's successful assessment of the experience, including several logistical challenges. To this end, this article seeks to help other student-led projects by relay- ing our service learning experience in a coherent, user-friendly manner that serves as a model experience. With two disasters behind them, some companies are applying lessons they have learned to their hurricane-related philanthropy. GE is a case in point. During the tsunami, the company put together a team of 50 project engineers-experts in portable water purification, energy, health care, and medical equipment. After Hurricane Katrina, GE executives took their cues from Jeffrey R. Immelt, GE's chief exec- utive, and reactivated the same tsunami team for New Orleans. "Jeff told us, 'Don't let anything stand in the way of getting aid where it's needed," said Robert Corcoran, vice president for corporate citizenship. Discuss how, with corporate backing, engineers who subscribe to Fred Cuny's ideas about effective disaster relief in his Disasters and Development (Oxford University Press, 1983) might approach the engineering challenges of Katrina. Corporate Responses Supportive corporate responses to the Hurricane Katrina were swift. By mid-September 2005, more than $312 million worth of aid had been donated by major corporations, much of it by those with no