Case question :

1. What was the basis for federal jurisdiction in this case?

2. Since the case was heard in federal court, why didn't the judge apply the law as generally applied in the

nation, rather than the law of Indiana?

Larry Bush, another Indiana resident, subsequently bought the WaveRunner in 1989 or 1990. Bush was the registered owner when the WaveRunner caused Land's injury. From the time of Bush's purchase, the boat was registered, garaged, and serviced in Indiana.

Between 1988 and 1998, 24 other WaveRunners were reported to have exploded. YMUS twice recalled certain models of WaveRunners for modifications to reduce the likelihood of fuel leakage. It never recalled the WR500 series....

Appellants argue that although they did not commence their action until well over ten years after delivery to the initial user, their case is not barred because ... California law, which includes no statute of repose, governs the action....

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo [i.e., take a fresh look at the evidence], construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.... Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the mov- ing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law....

Choice of Law

A federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction must apply the substantive law of the state in which it sits, 304 U.S. 64 ... (1938).... The Erie doctrine extends to choice-of-law principles and requires the court to apply the conflicts rules of the forum state.... Therefore, the district court properly applied the choice-of-law rule of Indiana.

Indiana applies a two-step conflicts analysis. Hubbard Mfg. v. Greeson (Ind. 1987). First, the court must determine if the place where the last event nec- essary to make the defendant liablethat is, the place of the injuryis insignificant.... If it is not, the law of that state applies.... Only if the court finds that the place of injury is insignificant does it move to step two which requires the court to consider "other factors such as: 1) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred; 2) the residence or place of business of the parties; and 3) the place where the relationship is centered."... In the instant case, we, like the district court, arrive at the inevitable conclusion that the place of the injuryIndianais not insignificant. Therefore, we apply Indiana law and need not address the second prong in Indiana's choice-of-law analysis....

Charles Land was injured while operating the WaveRunner in Indiana. He was a resident of Indiana, the owner of the boat was a resident of Indiana, and

the boat had been garaged and serviced in Indiana for a decade before it caused Land's injury. No evidence exists in the record that the WaveRunner was ever used outside of Indiana. It was not mere fortuity that the injury occurred in Indiana, as the Lands suggest by comparing this choice-of-law determination with those involving pass-through automobile or airplane acci- dents in which the place of the injury is given little weight, and the argument that Indiana's contacts have little or no relevance to the legal action simply cannot withstand scrutiny. Therefore, our analysis of Indiana choice-of-law policy must end with step one.

The Lands argue that California, where YMUS was incorporated and where the defendant's tortious conduct occurred, has greater relevance. Maybe so.... This analysis belongs in step two of the Indiana conflicts policy, how- ever, which we cannot reach. Some states use the "most significant relationship" approach suggested by the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. If Indiana did so, we would skip step one of our analysis and instead "isolate the pertinent issue, examine each state's connec- tion to the occurrence, identify the governmental policies espoused by each state relevant to the issue, and proclaim applicable the law of the state with the superior interest."... That case might have a different outcome from the one at hand. Indiana does not adhere to the most significant relationship analysis, however, and the Supreme Court of Indiana has not signaled that it intends to overrule Hubbard. Although Hubbard does note some discomfort with the rigid place of injury, or lex loci delicti, approach, it still adheres to an analysis that uses the place of injury as a baseline.... If the place of injury is not insig- nificant, we must apply its law regardless of the greater interest another state may have. The Lands propose an approach whereby the law of the place of the tortious conduct is controlling in product liability cases. The state of Indiana has given us no indication that it intends to change its choice-of-law policy to reach such a result, and we decline to make that policy decision for it. Indiana's contacts to this case are not insignificant. Therefore, its law, including the Statute of Repose, applies.

Because Indiana law governs this case and because the Indiana Statute of Repose bars product liability actions that, like this one, are brought more than ten years after delivery of the product to the ini- tial user or consumer, we find that the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. We AFFIRM.