CASE STUDY Game: Competing in Africa's playing fields Game is one of South Africa's largest retail stores. It consists of 93 large-format stores and describes itself as 'a promotionally driven discount cash retailer of predominantly fast- moving consumer goods or general merchandise, electrical appliances, and non-perish- able groceries for home, leisure and business use' As a discount cash retailer, Game has a high-volume, low-margin operating model that depends on making a high volume of sales at a lower price as well as on a sound and consistent promotional strategy. Game started expanding into Africa in the early 1990s when it realised that its South African market would mature quickly and that there was little space for investment in the already over-traded market. Recognising the retail market potential of the neighbouring southern African countries, Game started investing in Africa by opening its first store in 1993 in Botswana. It was only when the company decided to invest further afield, specifically in Uganda (2004), Nigeria (2005), Tanzania (2006) and Ghana (2007), that the reality of Africa kicked In. The opening of the Nigerian store was an 'absolute disaster,' Jan Potgieter recalled. He described how the first container of stock was held up for nine months at the local customs office because of Game's refusal to submit to bribery. By 2010, Game had a presence in 11 African countries and was planning to expand its footprint in Africa in another six coun- tries over the next five years. Game had found that it could not simply cut and paste its South African business model into other African contexts. The company therefore had a separate business plan and busi- ness model for every country. Thus, for example, whereas in South Africa, every store stocked 12 000 active products, some remote African stores such as Game Kampala had only 8 ODD, This was because the logistics of supplying the full range of products was pro- hibitive and because Game realised that the market was satisfied with a slightly more limited choice.Game also had to make a 'fundamental mind shift' to think smaller when doing busi- ness in Africa. Shopping centres were an unknown concept in most African countries so Game opted for stand-alone stores in most instances, and in some countries it developed its own small shopping centres consisting of one or two anchor shops and a few other outlets. Still, securing financing from the local banks proved to be trying as the bank offi- cials did not understand the concept of a shopping mall, having only had to finance ven- tures like roads and bridges in the past. Regarding the supply chain to the African countries, until about three or four years before, all distribution of stock had been managed centrally from South Africa. Game's experience in Nigeria changed this. While it was never part of the original procurement model, Game decided it was best to turn to local suppliers in Nigeria because of restrictions on certain imported products that meant that even one restricted product could hold a whole container back. In other countries, however, Game imported up to 90% of its stock from South Africa without any major difficulties. Logistical challenges were the order of the day for Game in Africa. A large portion of its goods had to be transported by road, but getting those goods to certain countries meant that in some cases truck drivers had to cross five different borders, The drivers thereforehad to build up good relations with the various border officials to speed up the process, particularly because Game incentivised the drivers with bonuses if they were able to deliver the goods on time. By 2010, it had become evident that despite the risks, it was indeed very profitable for the company to invest in Africa. Game stores in Africa generated far higher profit and return on investment than their South African counterparts. To date, Game was fortunate not to have had serious competition from international players, although the company did face some competition particularly from the other South African-based supermarket retailer, Shoprite Holdings, as well as the informal market. However, Potgieter expected a complete change in the African business landscape in the next five years and foresaw that more and more international businesses would start realising the investment potential of Africa. He was fairly convinced that big multinational players such as Wal-Mart and Carrefour, which, up until now, had shied away from invest- ing in Africa, would form partnerships with existing investors in Africa rather than risk going alone