Cecilia Espinoza, a lawful Mexican alien, applied for a position at Farah Manufacturing’s San Antonio Division. She was denied the position, however, as a result of Farah’s policy to hire only U.S. citizens. The issue to be decided by the court is whether Title VII’s proscription against discrimination on the basis of national origin protects against discrimination on the basis of citizenship. The Court determines that it does not.

Marshall, J.

The term “national origin” on its face refers lo the country where a person was born, or, more broadly, the country from which his or her ancestors came.

There are other compelling reasons to believe that Congress did not intend the term “national origin” to embrace citizenship requirements. Since 1914, the federal government itself, through Civil Service Commission regulations, has engaged in what amounts to discrimination against aliens by denying them the right to enter competitive examination for federal employment. But it has never been suggested that the citizenship requirement for federal employment constitutes discrimination because of national origin. To interpret the term “national origin” to embrace citizenship requirements would require us to conclude that Congress itself has repeatedly flouted its own declaration of policy. This Court cannot lightly find such a breach of faith. Certainly Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of citizenship whenever it has the purpose or effect of discriminating on the basis of national origin. However there is no indication in the record that Farah’s policy against employment of aliens had the purpose or effect of discriminating against persons of Mexican national origin.

Douglas, J., dissenting

It is odd that the Court which holds that a State may not bar an alien from the practice of law or deny employment to aliens can read a federal statute that prohibits discrimination in employment on account of “national origin” so as to permit discrimination against aliens.

Alienage results from one condition only: being born outside the United States. Those born within the country are citizens from birth. It could not be clearer that Farah’s policy of excluding aliens is de facto a policy of preferring those who were born in this country.

Case Questions

1. Which argument, the majority’s or the dissent, do you find more compelling?

2. What implications does this case have for hiring practices in parts of the United States where aliens arc prevalent?

3. If Espinoza could show that this policy, while arguably “facially neutral” actually impacts people of Mexican origin differently than people of American origin, wouldn’t Espinoza have a claim for disparate impact?