Suppose that two hunters, Alasdair (A) and Benedict (B), take part in such a game, which can be described as follows:

— if both hunters stalk a stag, they catch one with a probability 2/3 and then share it equally;

— if only one hunter stalks a stag, he then catches it with probability 0 (i.e., never catches one);

— a hunter who chooses not to stalk a stag, then poaches a hare with probability 1 (i.e., certainty);

— a hare is worth 1/10 of a stag.

a) In light of the above description of Rousseau’s deer hunt, represent this game in normal (strategic) form. Draw two payoff matrices, one where payoffs are represented in terms of i) stags, and the other in terms of ii) hares.

(Chapter 1 of Bowles, Fowley, and Halliday opens with a quote of philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau about a deer hunt (p. 23). )