Chapter 7

3. Baker and others entered a Walmart store shortly after 3:00 a.m. by cutting through the metal door with an acetylene torch. They had moved some of the merchandise in the store to the rear door, but the police arrived before the merchandise could be taken from the store. Baker was prosecuted for larceny. He raised the defense that he was not guilty of larceny because no merchandise had ever left the store. Is there enough intent and action for a crime? [Tennessee v. Baker, 751 S.W.2d 154 (Tenn. App.)]

4. Baker and others entered a Walmart store shortly after 3:00 a.m. by cutting through the metal door with an acetylene torch. They had moved some of the merchandise in the store to the rear door, but the police arrived before the merchandise could be taken from the store. Baker was prosecuted for larceny. He raised the defense that he was not guilty of larceny because no merchandise had ever left the store. Is there enough intent and action for a crime? [Tennessee v. Baker, 751 S.W.2d 154 (Tenn. App.)]

Chapter 8

1. Baker and others entered a Walmart store shortly after 3:00 a.m. by cutting through the metal door with an acetylene torch. They had moved some of the merchandise in the store to the rear door, but the police arrived before the merchandise could be taken from the store. Baker was prosecuted for larceny. He raised the defense that he was not guilty of larceny because no merchandise had ever left the store. Is there enough intent and action for a crime? [Tennessee v. Baker, 751 S.W.2d 154 (Tenn. App.)]

6. Juanita DeJesus was seriously injured when hit on the head by a foul ball at a minor league baseball game and sued the stadium operators for negligence and premises liability. The case progressed to the Indiana Supreme Court where the Indianapolis Indians urged the State Supreme Court to dispose of the premises liability and negligence claims in one fell swoop by adopting the so-called Baseball Rule, which provides that:

a ballpark operator that provides screening behind home plate sufficient to meet ordinary demand for protected seating has fulfilled its duty with respect to screening and cannot be subjected to liability for injuries resulting to a spectator by an object leaving the playing field. Should the court adopt this clear and unambiguous rule for the national pastime? Does the court have authority to make such a ruling? How would you decide her negligence claim? [South Shore Baseball, LLC v. DeJesus, 11 N.E.3d 903 (Ind.)]