Coase Theorem: There is 1 firm (polluter) and 1 household (pollution victim). The firm incurs all abatement costs, and the household incurs all damages from pollution. Society faces a choice between "low", "medium" and "high" emissions, with the following abatement costs and damages. (a) What is the socially efficient level of emissions? (b) Suppose the firms owns the right to pollute, and transaction costs are infinitely high. What level of emissions will the firm choose? Is this outcome socially efficient? (c) Suppose transaction costs were zero, and the firm owned the right to pollute. Will the firm and household reach an agreement over the level of emissions? If so: (i) what level of emissions will they negotiate (ii) what is the maximum price the household is willing to pay the firm (iii) what is the minimum possible price the firm is willing to accept? (d) Suppose the household owns the right to pollute, and transaction costs are infinitely high. What level of emissions will the household choose? Is this outcome socially efficient? (e) Suppose transaction costs were zero, and the household owned the right to pollute. Will the firm and household reach an agreement over the level of emissions? If so: (i) what level of emissions will they negotiate (ii) what is the maximum price the firm is willing to pay the household (iii) what is the minimum possible price the household is willing to accept