Compute the Cournot equilibrium; that is, find prices, quantities, and profits. 2. Suppose that firms 1 and 2 merge, converting the market into a duopoly consisting of the "superfirm" and firm 3. Compute the new Cournot equilibrium. Once again find prices, quantities, and profits. 3. Suppose that all three firms merge. Compute quantities, prices, and profits for the cartel solution. 4. Suppose that firm 1 and 2 represent two members of OPEC - Saudi Arabia and Venezuela, say - while firm 3 is a non-OPEC oil exporting country - Russia, say. Describe the dynamics of OPEC. (Hint: You can re-interpret the solution to part 2, as 1 firm deviating from the fully cartelized solution. Is it convenient to have a partial cartel?)